Innovation: A Literature Survey by Cloutier, Mathieu
1 
 






























Département de sciences économiques 











 What is innovation? To what point is it an economical phenomenon? What are the ways 
it is being modeled? This survey aims to cover all the main work that has been published on the 
topic from as many angles as possible. First, early definitions will be presented along with the 
main work around its characteristics, functions, types, etc. Also what stimulates and hinders 
technological change will be discussed. Then, there will be an expository on the agents relevant 
to the process: who they are, what is an entrepreneur and what role the financier or the banker 
held in history. Following this, the concept of exogenous knowledge (the pool from which 
innovation are picked from) and endogenous knowledge will be contrasted. To conclude the first 
part, a few concepts pertaining to innovation will be presented: appropriability, spillovers, 
diffusion of innovation, experimentation/imitation, etc. In the second part, the survey will look 
more in depth at models involving in a way or another innovation.  The models will be divided 
into 4 major categories, which are industrial organisation, macroeconomics, game theory and 
production functions. The conclusion of the survey will address such issues as the different 
opinions pertaining to competitive market/capitalism and innovation and even opposite point of 
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What is innovation? Little is known about the subject because even if it is not a new 
concept in literature, it has seldom been the main purpose of analysis. Most papers and 
textbooks consider innovation as an exogenous shock in their model of employment, market 
structure, etc. even the papers on intellectual property rarely give something more than a vague 
definition of the concept of innovation. Because of its nature of complement in most of the 
works, there is no unique definition or unique way to model technical change. Therefore, 
authors define innovation through the purpose they require from it or their need of the 
moment. Also, most of the models presented in Part II do not address innovation directly but 
rather through growth with technical change (Romer (1986)), patent races (Reinganum (1980) 
and Scotchmer (2004)) or productivity growth (Griliches (1998)), for example. This observation 
was quite a surprise because innovation or technological creativity is often viewed as a “key 
ingredient of economic growth”(Mokyr (1990)). Why a so important notion in economics has 
not been more studied or formalized is still a mystery. The beginning of an explanation could be 
the difficulty to define the concept, and thus to search for it in empirical studies. In recent years, 
one popular attempt to empirically assess the impact of innovation was to do an econometric 
study of the influence of R&D expenditures on productivity. An example would be Griliches’ 
(1998) paper. For a good survey on those attempts, one should refer to Link (2007). This survey 
will try to present the usual definitions of numerous fields such as industrial organisation, game 
theory, macroeconomics, etc., and the evolution of those definitions through times.  
 
One of the first theorists who took innovation into account was Schumpeter(1935) in 
the beginning of the 20th century in his book “Theory of Economic Development” (1935). Even if 
his theory was more about economic development than innovation, the ideas he proposed have 
been implicit in most of the works along the century and are still currently used. The expression 
“Schumpeterian technical change” is widely used and can be briefly summarized as the opinion 
that the creation of new ideas largely occurs at an autonomous rate, but that the 
implementation of these new techniques by entrepreneurs can be explained by economic 
phenomena. In this survey, there will be no distinction between the concepts of innovation, 
technological progress and technical change. There is no unique definition of innovation and no 
unique way to introduce it in a model, most of the authors will redefine it to serve their 
purpose. The point of this survey will therefore be to try to distillate the essence of what 
previous authors meant by innovation and to synthesise it succinctly. To do so, this work is 
divided in two main parts. The first one covers the most common definitions of innovation, 
those that are, most of the time, clearly enunciated in seminal works, beginning with 
Schumpeter’s and climbing up to more modern ones. At the same time, the concepts used by 
the authors of the definitions will be exposed, not only because they are inherent to the 
definitions but also because some of them bring valuable insight on innovation. Those 
approaches of the matter will then be compared and contrasted to the new contribution of 
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Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelps (2011). Moreover, the first part will stray a little from the pure 
concept of innovation to assess other notions. For example, if one says that in its more basic 
form, innovation is simply the application of a new idea, then is the concept of an idea also is an 
economic matter or not? There are in fact, two possible answers to that question and they will 
be both discussed below. In the second part, the main models pertaining to innovation will be 
presented. Their pros and cons will be listed and contrasted when possible, to the newly 
proposed definition. They are divided among four main families: production function models, 
industrial organisation models, macroeconomics models and economic history, and game theory 
models. However, it is often the case that some of them are in more than one group. There are 
also some exotic models that do not fit in any of the categories but are interesting enough to be 
presented. Usually, innovation is not the core subject of the papers from which these models 
are taken from, and thus there is not much to do else than expose how innovation is introduce 
in the model and how it affects its mechanics.  
 
Before getting into the core of this work, let us follow the steps of Tufano’s 2002 survey 
on financial innovation and enounce some basic remarks about innovation. First of all, 
“Innovate” is defined in Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as “to introduce as or as if new,” with 
the root of the word deriving from the Latin word “novus” or new. Also, economists use the 
word “innovation” in an expansive fashion to describe shocks to the economy (e.g., monetary 
policy innovations) as well as the responses to these shocks (e.g., Eurodeposits). Moreover, 
innovation includes many steps, such as invention and diffusion. Boldrin and Levine (2008) 
describe a two-phase process as “First comes the research and development or invention step, 
aimed at developing the new good or process; second comes the stage of mass production, in 
which many copies of the initial prototype are reproduced and distributed”. Finally, one should 
be aware that the term invention can be an overly generous, because most innovations are 
evolutionary adaptations of prior products. One should not underestimate the significance of 
the “as if” in the definition because almost nothing is completely “new”. Also quite interesting 
as introductory remarks are Nordhaus’ (1969) stylized facts on technological change:  
1) Technological change is the major source of growth of per capita income. 
2) Although in most modern price and growth theory technological change is (often) 
treated as exogenous, this must be interpreted as an analytical convenience rather than 
as a serious statement about the economic system.  
3) Invention is an activity with substantial external economies, meaning that knowledge is 
a commodity with the property of being expensive to produce but cheap to reproduce 
(non-rival, non-exclusive) (a more complete description of Nordhaus’(1969) model will 
be provided further in the present work).  
4) Many economists have argued that there is a bias in the inventive process toward 
labour-saving inventions. This idea has been generalised by the theory presented below 
of factor price induced technical change. 
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5) An invention has an economic life which most of the elements and phases will be 
presented throughout this survey.  
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2. Part 1 Innovation and pertaining concepts in the literature 
 
 Let us begin by the end and commence by stating the new contribution of Amarante, 
Ghossoub and Phelps (2011), this will allow further comparisons to be easier. In their model, 
everyone in the economy face a set of publicly-known possible states of the world for future 
period. Since everybody knows about those states, they all have a subjective probability 
distribution on them. Then agents known as entrepreneurs “think” about new possible states. 
Hence, the innovation is both the set of new space proposed by the entrepreneurs and an asset 
which pays contingent on those states. Clearly, this definition has many pros, the major one 
being its generality. Although those terms will be more defined later let us  say that the 
definition suggested by Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelps can easily be applied to almost any 
kind of innovation, whether it is a financial, a process or a product innovation. Not all definitions 
we are about to see can achieve this. The entrepreneur then takes his innovation to a financier 
for him to invest in the asset. This concept was already anticipated in the work of Schumpeter: 
Theory of economic evolution (1934). 
 
 Boldrin and Levine (2008) define innovation as the first time a good is actually produced 
or an activity is employed. In Schumpeter’s book (1934), production is described as a 
combination (or a recipe) of the different inputs: labour and land. To produce something else or 
something differently, it is done by simply combining inputs in a new/different way. Thus, an 
innovation is nothing more than a new combination of inputs or a new recipe. For Schumpeter,  
innovation encloses five cases: 1) A new good or a new quality of an old good (this will later be 
described as product innovation), 2) A new method of production which is not necessarily 
derived from a new scientific discovery but maybe only from a new management or marketing 
idea, for example Ford’s assembly line, which will later be described as process innovation, 3) 
Opening of a new market opportunity, 4) Conquest of new resources, 5) Realisation of a new 
market structure or organisation like a monopoly. The idea that market structure is important 
for innovation, mostly for inventive incentives is one of the premises of the industrial 
organisation school of thoughts, but again this matter will be discussed later on. One other 
significant aspect of Schumpeter’s theory is the idea of creative destruction which says, that 
new combinations always ruin or completely replace the previous ones. In part 2, recent models 
of creative destruction will be presented. Then, the next interesting aspect of Schumpeter’s 
theory is its anticipation of the difference between an entrepreneur and a capitalist, and the 
significant importance of the banker for the capitalist system. For the author, the capitalist is 
only the owner of capital, whereas the entrepreneur is the one who creates the new 
combination. Sometimes, they are the same or if the entrepreneur commercialise himself his 
innovation, he can become a capitalist, but most of the time they are two distinct agents. 
Because the author describes an enterprise as the execution of new combinations and also their 
realisation or implementation in exploitation, the entrepreneur is nothing without production 
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means, that is when the banker enters the scene. In Schumpeter’s theory, the banker plays the 
same role as the financier in Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelps’s (2011) model. Because the 
entrepreneur does not initially produce anything (except in rare cases where he is already an in-
place capitalist or a rich heir), he needs credit to “reroute” the purchasing power necessary to 
put in place his factory. Schumpeter’s model also describes why the entrepreneur is an isolated 
character. Although this notion is more deeply discussed in Mokyr (1990), the contribution of 
Schumpeter (1935) is note wise. The latter says that the normal economic agent follows his 
experience, with the economical circuit being in a kind of inertia and the novelty being an 
obstacle to the regular flow. Thus, the execution of new combinations is a peculiar function, a 
privilege of people less numerous than those who would have the opportunity to do the same. 
Everyone has in himself the capacity to be an entrepreneur/innovator in the same way, 
everyone has the possibility to sing, but only the most talented one become singers. Why is it so 
hard to stray from the main stream? For Schumpeter (1935) there are 3 key reasons: 1) the 
agent straying from the usual path lacks for his decision the data that he usually knows very 
well. This can be looked at in parallel with the Knightian uncertainty present in the Amarante, 
Ghossoub and Phelps model. 2) It is objectively harder to innovate than to continue the usual 
pattern, 3) there is usually a negative reaction to innovation from the social environment. 
Finally, another important matter that we will be treating later, but that Schumpeter broached, 
was the exogenous character of the idea rather than of the innovation. As mentioned, 
Schumpeterian innovation involves an autonomous idea generation but an economically 
explained innovation. Hence, for him, the entrepreneur does not create or find new possibilities; 
they are always present, forming a rich heap of knowledge constituted by professionals or 
scientists. They are known previously by someone else and if there are writers they are spread 
by them. Therefore, the innovator and the entrepreneur are also two completely distinct 
persons for Schumpeter. One interesting point to mention is that Schumpeter’s book has been 
criticized by many of his contemporary peers for incensing too much the entrepreneur. 
Following Schumpeter, J.H. von Thünen (Link (2007)) set forth an explanation of profit that 
clearly distinguishes the function and reward of the entrepreneur from that of the capitalist. 
Thünen identified entrepreneurial gain as profit minus (1) interest on invested capital, (2) 
insurance against business losses, and (3) management wages. 
 
 
There are many other authors who wrote about the identity of the innovators. For 
example, in Von Hippel’s book entitled “The Source of Innovation” (1988),  an innovator is 
defined as : “the firm or individual that first developed a scientific instrument innovation to a 
state proved functionally useful, as indicated by the publication of data generated by a scientific 
journal”. Hippel (1988) then suggests that technological change comes from multiple sources in 
opposition to the common idea that it comes mainly from manufacturers. The reason why one 
might think that innovators are mostly manufacturers comes from the fact that the association 
of a manufacturer with an innovation is usually much more public than that of others such as 
users. For example, in the course of marketing an innovation, manufacturers may advertise 
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“their” innovative device even if they are not the initial inventor. Von Hippel’s theory on the 
functional source of innovation stipulates that innovators could be categorized according to 
their functional relationship through which they derive benefit from a given product, process or 
service innovation. What the author discovers is that the source greatly varies from an industry 
to another. In some fields users develop most innovations, in others however, suppliers of 
related components and materials are the typical sources of innovation. In other fields, 
conventional wisdom holds and product manufacturers are indeed the typical innovators. In the 
remainder of his book, Von Hippel (1988) explores why the variation in the functional sources 
occurs and how it might be predicted. The author’s explanation for the great variation in the 
source of technological change arise from his analysis of the temporary profits (economic rents) 
expected by potential innovators. A successful innovator’s rent may come in the form of cost 
savings and/or increased prices and/or increased sales obtainable during his period of 
temporary and partial monopoly. Thus, he contends that one could predict the most likely 
source of a future innovation by looking at which functional category would most likely benefit 
from it. However, the task of calculating expected economic rents from a not already invented 
product is quite a daunting endeavour. To achieve it, Von Hippel’s strategy was to study several 
innovation categories in details and try to understand the thinking and options available to 
potential innovators in these fields.  Hence, a great proportion of the Von Hippel’s book is 
allocated to case studies and ex-post analysis. To what extent this inferring approach is subject 
to the hindsight-bias is discussable. 
 
The entrepreneur as the main actor in technological change has been around for a 
while. Quoting Link (2007): “[an entrepreneur is ] someone who specializes in taking 
responsibility for and making judgmental decisions that affect the location, the form, and the 
use of goods, resources, or institutions”, define entrepreneurship as referring to perception of 
opportunity and the ability to act on that perception. Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) surveyed 
the literature on different mainstream/neoclassical modeling techniques that have been used to 
capture the entrepreneurial function in the economy. For them, entrepreneurship is not 
management, but it also involves more than just alertness and boldness. They also believe his 
importance hinges on the fact that the real world is filled with Knightian uncertainty because 
human cognitive abilities are severely limited relative to the available information, and also 
because human action is an open-ended process rather than the result of dynamic optimization. 
Hence, they give the following definition of entrepreneurship: “the ability and willingness of 
individuals, both on their own and within organizations to: i) innovate, i.e. perceive and create 
new economic opportunities; ii) face uncertainty, i.e. introduce their ideas in the market by 
making decisions on location, form and the use of resources and institutions; and iii) manage 
their business by competing with others for a share of that market” (Bianchi and Henrekson 
(2005)). For a long time, the task of including the entrepreneur in a neoclassical model was 
impossible; even Barreto (1989) has recently contended that it was indeed infeasible. 
Consequently, Bianchi and Henrekson (2005) explain that economic theory ignored the 
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entrepreneur because of the challenge to include it in a model. In their survey, they have 
identified three crucial attributes of entrepreneurs that have been stressed in more substantive 
modeling efforts: i) they are (generally speaking) “more talented”, ii) they have greater 
tolerance towards risk-bearing and iii) they are innovators (either as individuals or as firms 
involved in R&D activities). They then label three categories of entrepreneurship modeling 
according to which of these attributes were more emphasized. First, the talented entrepreneur 
models: an example being Lucas’s (1978) paper which focused on the coordinating function of 
the entrepreneur. This basic feature goes way back to Say (1845) and has commonly 
characterized the entrepreneur in economic theory until recently. This category can be called 
the managerial approach of entrepreneurship. The entrepreneur is merely seen as a peculiar 
form of labour input, but instead of entering the production function, it transforms it in the 
following way:             where g(.) is increasing and concave. However, this approach 
clearly contrasts with the generally accepted fact, by authors as lauded as Knight (1921), 
Schumpeter (1934) or Kirsner (1997) and also by the majority of the scientific community, that 
entrepreneurship is much more than just a managerial input and cannot be considered as simply 
as a different form of labour. Second, the risk-bearing entrepreneurs: the influential work of 
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) adds the element of riskbearing to the neoclassical general 
equilibrium model. Now, the entrepreneur is no longer only a manager but “takes the 
responsibility of an enterprise”. This model can be seen as a refinement of Lucas model because 
not only does the entrepreneurs differ by their g(.) function but also by their risk aversion. They 
forego a fixed wage in exchange of risky profits and also decide how many workers to employ. 
At the equilibrium, there is a unique cut-off level of an agent risk aversion such that all agents 
with risk aversions smaller than it will be entrepreneurs and the rest will be workers, also the 
less risk-averse entrepreneurs will hire more workers in order to bear more risk and achieve 
more profits. Third, the innovative entrepreneurs’ model: more recently, endogenous growth 
theory has developed some Schumpeterian ideas, focusing in particular on the process of 
innovation related to R&D activities. The models have two key features: “individuals are 
continuously faced with opportunities for developing new products, i.e. the dynamics of growth 
(technical progress, demographic change) always create “disequilibria” and thus potential 
profits. Second, individuals differ in their ability to exploit these emerging opportunities. The 
first feature is modeled assuming an exogenous rate of technical progress and the second one 
by defining an ability parameter which mitigates the risk of creating new businesses: the more 
talented agents are, the less likely they are going to undertake an unsuccessful enterprise 
(Bianchi and Henrekson (2005)). In the competitive equilibrium of this model, people with low 
ability only manage already existing firms, people with high ability only set up new businesses 
and people with intermediate ability either manage businesses they started or trade for higher 
quality businesses (dismissing their current one). One can see the major contribution of the 
simple and intuitive formalization of the idea that has been the central point of the analysis of 
Schumpeter, Kirzner and Schultz, i.e. the existence of individuals with special abilities to 
innovate and capture profit opportunities. However, for the first time the principal flaw of many 
models to be presented in part II arises: the exogeneity of the technological progress and the 
focus on risk rather than knightian uncertainty. In Appendix 1, one can refer to the summary and 
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assessment of many authors mentioned in the Bianchi and Henrekson survey. Finally, the 
authors conclude their work by stating that all these contributions highlight and formally 
analyze only one particular feature of entrepreneurship, each and that if one wants a theory 
that captures the essentials of it, these models are too restrictive, since the entrepreneurial 
function is far more complex: “We conclude that an individual real-world entrepreneur, even if 
highly stylized, cannot at present be modeled in mainstream economics, since he or she does 
elude analytical tractability. In this sense, the neoclassical entrepreneur is (still) not 
entrepreneurial” (Bianchi and Henrekson (2005)). There is therefore still place for a broader 
model including all the features and dealing with kngithtian uncertainty and endogenous 
innovation.  
 
Based on the definitions of the economic agents relevant to innovation that were just 
presented, one could divide the theories of entrepreneurship in two categories: supply side 
theories and demand side theories. Supply-side theories of entrepreneurship emphasize the role 
of the entrepreneur in production and distribution of goods and services for which there is an 
independently determined demand. It is certainly the older of the two approaches because 
earlier inquiries into the subject tended to focus on the following question:  “Given the pattern 
of demand for existing goods and services, what role does the entrepreneur play in the market 
place?” (Link (2007)). The demand-side theory of entrepreneurship emphasizes the role of the 
entrepreneur for existing goods and services by introducing new goods and services or new 
combinations of existing goods and services.  The equivalent question for this group would be: 
“Given the pattern of supply for existing goods and services, what role does the entrepreneur 
play in the marketplace?”. For example, in Schumpeter’s (1935) model of a circular flow, where 
the economy is in a kind of inertia, the process of carrying out new combinations is a 
disturbance of the circular flow. Thus, his theory would be a demand-side theory of innovation 
and so would be Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelp’s as well.  In Norhaus’ book entitled “Invention, 
Growth and Welfare” (1969), the author gives a completely different definition of those two 
concepts. For the latter, the supply-side theorist consider the supply of invention to be 
determined by state of knowledge and by the inclination of autonomously supplied inventors, 
whereas the demand-side ones are more profit-oriented and hold economic necessity to be the 
mother of invention. What both authors agree on is that the correct view must be a synthesis of 
the two schools of thought. We will see how Nordhaus (1969) tries to achieve such a synthesis 
in the presentation of his model in part II, the section on production function model of 
innovation.  
 
 There are many accepted characteristics of innovation and the remainder of this section 
will try to stress the most known and relevant ones. Almost, every author who will be presented 
in this survey, but mostly the IO group such as Scotchmer (2004), from which the following 
description comes, considers that an innovation is the result of the addition of an idea and of 
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investments. Thus, it can be represented by a triplet of the form (v, c, p) where v is the social 
value or the per period consumer’s surplus with competitive supply of the innovation, c is the 
cost of developing and commercializing the idea and p is the probability that a certain way to 
“discover” the innovation succeeds. This last notion is implicit in many patent races models 
where each firm tries to be the first to create the innovation. If the social value is eternal and 
the supply is competitive, the discounted social value of the innovation is thus v/r. The profit per 
period is generally seen as a proportion of the social value     with    being between 0 and 1. 
If the patent or the innovation has a finite lifetime of T periods, then the total profit for the 
innovator or the entrepreneur would be        . The exogenous property of the idea will 
be discussed below. However, this kind of technical definition of the innovation process 
achieves a good balance between the limits on human imagination and the incentive problem of 
marshalling resources. Another largely accepted characteristic of innovation is its public good 
(non-rival and non-exclusive) nature. Many authors like Scotchmer (2004), Mokyr (2002), 
Nordhaus (1969) and Reinganum (1989), agree with this while a few like Boldrin, Levine and 
Quah (2002) do not. Economic theory teaches us that the main consequence of such an 
assumption is that innovation is under-produced in a market economy because the positive 
externalities cannot be fully appropriate by the innovating firm. The ideas of appropriability and 
spillovers will be explored more deeply in the next section and the consequences of the public 
good attribute will be revisited in the conclusion of this survey. Like it has been mentioned 
earlier, one can divide innovation in two main categories: process and product innovation. In 
Atkeson’s (2007) paper, that will be presented below, the author studies those two subdivisions 
and describes them as follow: “Our model includes two forms of innovation: innovation to 
increase the stock of this firm specific factor (firm has a stock of some firm specific factor that 
determines its current profit opportunities, examples: productivity, managerial skill, product 
quality, or brand name in an existing firm) — process innovation and innovation to create new 
firms with a new initial stock of the firm specific factor —product innovation”. Put another way, 
process innovation is directed towards reducing the firm’s marginal cost of producing a specific 
product while product innovation aims at creating new goods and new industries. In Tufano’s 
(2002) survey on financial innovation and Link’s (2007) survey also observe the generality of this 
distinction.  
 
 Like it has been described earlier, the innovation process requires in most of the models 
an idea that needs investment to be transformed into a marketable innovation. Usually, 
economists consider the innovation process to be an economic phenomenon but not the 
generation or occurring of the idea. However, no model of the process could be built without 
some assumptions about the origins of these ideas. There are two ways this concept has been 
modeled in the past. The first and oldest way views that the idea creation is exogenous. One can 
describe this conceptualisation as if there were a pool of basic, pure knowledge or ideas the 
scientific community extends by doing its professional work. Meanwhile the potential 
entrepreneurs are continuously assessing the market potential of the ideas floating in the pool, 
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marketing them as they become profitable. This way of modeling the process clearly follows 
Schumpeter’s vision for which the entrepreneur and the inventor are rarely the same person. It 
is also the way Nordhaus (1969) describes the process in his book. For him, it is important to 
distinguish between two kinds of knowledge; general and technical. The distinction refers to the 
usefulness of the knowledge in producing either more knowledge (the general kind) or more 
goods (technical knowledge). The production of these two kinds of knowledge goes as follow, 
pure research generates general knowledge when labour and capital inputs are combined with 
general knowledge. Invention occurs when labour and capital inputs are combined with general 
knowledge to produce technical knowledge. In Nordhaus’ book entitled “Invention, Growth and 
Welfare” (1969), the second type is obviously emphasized. This concept of basic and applied 
research is widely spread in the field and is used, among other places, in Scotchmer’s (2004) 
book “Innovation and Incentives”, which depicts a model capable of explaining basic research 
even if this research has no market value in itself. The second option of exogenous occurring 
ideas considers there is no pool at all and the innovations just appear in entrepreneurs’ minds 
usually by a stochastic process. For example, Loury (1979) uses a Poisson distribution to model 
the appearance of ideas, but other papers uses exponential, normal, Brownian, etc. 
distributions. However, because it left more space for endogeneity, this way leaded to the first 
endogenous modeling of ideas occurrence.  One way to modify the stochastic process in order 
to achieve such a goal could be by introducing endogenous variables, most of the time R&D 
expenditures or by research good accumulation models. Indeed, innovation comes from 
purposive, profit-seeking investment in knowledge by firms involved in R&D activities, 
sometimes modeled following the patent race literature in industrial organization (see Tirole 
1998). Also, the innovation completely displaces previous products or leaders in an industry, 
allowing the winner to enjoy some monopolistic power until another innovation arrives. Finally, 
one can see that this issue can be synthesized by the idea of the “standing on the shoulder of 
giants” followers and Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” concept adepts with the latter being 
the exogenous generation type. However, this process in itself is really not Schumpeterian 
because there is no “new man” involved in novel and extraordinary activities, but rather a large 
scale, routinized, (almost) predictable path of innovation via investments. This conception does 
not find a proper justification in Schumpeter’s theory but rather in one of his early critics, 
namely Solo (1951): “Innovation is more realistically analyzed as an ordinary business activity 
than as the extraordinary efforts of new firms and new men; invention and innovation are 
subject to costs and result in revenues like any other business activity; and both are carried out 
in competitive struggle by firms which are at once producers and innovator’ ”. An example of a 
model using such a creative environment is found in Reinganum’s (1989) paper on patent race. 
A particular invention is sought simultaneously by a number of identical potential inventors 
(firms). Another aspect of endogenous idea generation is the “standing on shoulder of giants 
effect” present among other places in Hoon and Phelps (2001). This effect introduces 
cumulativeness of innovation, a process which, according to Scotchmer (2004), could take three 
forms: 1) the next innovation could not be invented without the first, 2) the first one reduces 
the cost of achieving the next one and 3) the first accelerates the development of the second. 
The more realistic hypothesis would be that maybe some ideas originate from thin air, without 
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using previous research, like the wheel, fire, etc. and other ideas are issued from an ongoing 
process of basic scientific research building on previous endeavours. One could question the 
inclusion of fire in the category of innovation but as it has been seen, innovation is not only the 
discovery of a natural phenomenon or scientific theory but also its implementation and 
adoption through industrial, domestic, etc. uses. There is also a last way knowledge enters 
models. A good example for it is in Romer’s (1986) model of endogenous technological change 
considers that knowledge has an input good that enters into the production function the same 
way labour or capital does except that it has increasing marginal productivity.  Atkeson (2007) 
combines the use of a research good with a stochastic process of innovation.  
 
 Another note wise contribution of Tufano’s (2004) paper is its list of the functions of a 
financial innovation. Although the innovation this authors focus on is the financial one, his 
contribution to the concept is interesting and unique. Tufano (2004) defines a financial 
innovation as “the act of creating and then popularizing new financial instruments as well as 
new financial technologies, institutions and markets... (they) are optimal responses to various 
basic problem or opportunities, such as incomplete markets that prevent risk shifting or 
asymmetric information”.   Hence, according to him, financial innovation has 6 functions:  
(1) Innovation exists to complete inherently incomplete markets. 
(2) Innovation persists to address inherent agency concerns and information 
asymmetries: Much of contracting theory (or the security design literature) explores 
how contracts can be written to better align the interests of different parties or to 
force the revelation of private information by managers. This extensive literature has 
been surveyed by Harris and Raviv (1989), and is also covered in Allen and Gale (1994, 
pp. 140-147). 
(3) Innovation exists so parties can minimize transaction, search or marketing costs. 
(4)  Innovation is a response to taxes and regulation While many authors have pointed 
out the link between taxes and innovation, Miller (1986) is often cited on this point. 
(5) Increasing globalization and risk motivate innovation. 
(6) Technological shocks stimulate innovation. 
 
 
 Let us now address the issue of what stimulates and what hinders innovation and 
present the ideas of a historical economist, J. Mokyr as he listed them in his book entitled “The 
Lever of Riches” (1990). The author synthesizes the factors determining the propensity of a 
member of a society to invent and which factors make others want to adopt the invention 
(however, the less relevant ones for a theoretic model will be discarded for examples: life 
expectancy, nutrition, geographical environment, etc.): 1) Willingness to bear risks: the structure 
of preferences regarding risk of the economic agents clearly affects the incentive and deterrent 
to innovate. 2) Path dependency: this factor encloses both the concept of spillovers and 
knowledge accumulation that will be covered later, 3) Labour costs: the initial hypothesis 
stipulates that a high cost of labour input stimulates technological creativity. Historically, many 
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authors (for example H. J. Habakkuk (1962)) have observed the fact that technological 
innovations are biased towards the augmentation of the capital-labour ratio, i.e. labour saving. 
However, there has been a generalisation of this hypothesis that will be discussed below in what 
has been labelled the factor-price induced models of innovation. 4) Science and technology: this 
factor is about the size of the pool of knowledge or metatechnological knowledge (as Mokyr 
(1990) calls it) from which innovations are drawn. There is a classical distinction made by Francis 
Bacon between inventions that depend on a state of knowledge and those that could have been 
made at almost any time. The lack of new basic scientific discoveries and thus the depleting of 
the pool of knowledge mentioned earlier could, in the long term, hinder the occurring of new 
innovations of the latter type. 5) Social environment: Clearly, if an individual lives in a society 
where, because of religion or mores, innovation or change in itself is seen as wrong, his 
propensity to spend time innovating could be lowered. There is a collective set of valuations 
that determines the relative prestige of various activities or attributes within a society. For 
example, in ancient Greece, sports and learning where lauded, whereas in the Roman Empire, 
the highest value was placed on administrative and military skills. Therefore, innovations like 
philosophy or the catapults were more likely to appear in those civilizations respectively. Also, 
when one thinks more broadly, it is only recently that production is no longer an occupation for 
slaves or the lower class. The creative energies of the best educated and most successful 
persons where thus channelled elsewhere and they became philosophers, priest or generals 
instead of entrepreneurs or engineers. The transition in an era where economical success is 
seen as greatly valuable could be one social explanation of the steep acceleration of product 
and process innovations in recent years. 6) Institutions and property rights: For Mokyr (1990), 
the fear of brigand stealing the fruit of your work or of the prince giving away your successful 
start up to one of is relative, clearly deters one to invest his time and money in an idea that 
could lead to an innovation. This, of course, is the point of view of a historical economist, 
however, industrial organization theorists also believe that property rights and mostly 
intellectual property are primordial to the innovation process, their ideas and models will be 
presented in the second part of this survey. 7) Politics: The type of government in place also 
affects the incentives to innovate. As Mokyr (1990) states it: “A strong, centralized government 
secure enough to withstand riots and political pressure from coalitions representing losers 
(Mokyr’s conceptualization is that by shifting the market structure or market leaders, 
innovations always create winners and losers), may have been able to resist the pressures 
exerted by the technological status quo. Yet it is equally plausible that a weak government that 
succumbed to demands to legislate technological progress away would be powerless to enforce 
such laws, and thus by default leave the decision to market forces. It seems that as a general 
rule, then, the weaker the government, the better it is for innovation. With some notable 
exceptions, autocratic rulers have tended to be hostile or indifferent to technological change”. 
8) Demographics: on this point, Mokyr quotes the Simon’s (1983) model of economies of scale 
in technological change. It contends that the size of the population determines the supply of 
potential inventors, the size of the market for the improved or cheaper good, the importance of 
specialization, etc. On the opposite, following what Schumpeter said, Mokyr (1990) describes 
the principal hindrance to innovation as conservatism. However, he goes further and 
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distinguishes between individual and collective conservatism. Collective conservatism is what 
has been seen in the social factor above and when interests groups have a stake in maintaining 
status quo. However, the most interesting definition of personal conservatism is what is called 
bounded rationality, i.e. the inability of individuals to process and manipulate large amounts of 




Before getting into a more formal description of the models involving innovation, a few 
more concepts might be interesting to analyse. Some will be referred to in the second part while 
some are only presented for the insights they give on innovations and everything that surrounds 
it. Let us begin by the notion of spillovers that is pervasive in almost all models below. The first 
thing to note is that it is a weaker form of the non-exclusive characteristic of public goods. 
Spillovers are the diffusion of the innovation information through the industry and the public 
knowledge. There are many ways this notion has been modeled before. Sometimes the 
technology level of a firm is a function of its R&D expenditures and of the technology level of the 
rest of the firms in the industry (as in Atkeson (2007), Griliches (1998), Nordhaus (1969) and 
Reinganum (1981)) usually through catching a proportion of the rivals’ research endeavours. 
Sometimes buying a good is enough to be able to reproduce it and thus the innovator has a 
monopoly only for the first sale (Boldrin and Levine (2008), Quah (2002)). In such a model, the 
value of the innovation is thus the market value of the first unit of the new product. 
Reinganum’s (1981) paper modeled a cooperative game where the firms can share research 
trough wanted spillovers which leads to a lower level of aggregate R&D and a later innovation. 
Appropriability describes the characteristic of an innovation to prevent such leaking out and 
whether or not ideas can be obtained without paying the current owner. Therefore, a 
completely appropriable innovation is one on which the innovator would build a monopoly as 
long as the innovation does not become obsolete. The most common view on appropriability is 
that: “If a firm cannot expect to appropriate the full value of the knowledge it generates, its R & 
D effort will be correspondingly reduced. The patent system is an attempt to mitigate the 
disincentive of nonappropriability. However, the social value of an innovation may exceed the 
monopoly rents. Hence patents may provide only a partial remedy” (Reinganum (1981)). Other 
ways of preventing spillovers are trade secrets, copyrights, etc. (for a description of all of them, 
refer to Scotchmer (2004) chapter 3). However, to quote Scotchmer: “Intellectual property 
rights are inherently difficult to enforce, since they are exclusive rights to “information,” and 
information has the character of a public good”. For Boldrin and Levine (2008), spillovers are not 
costless and this is the reason why they contend that innovation does not require intellectual 
property. For them, innovation is not disembodied: “We argue, instead, that ideas have value 
only insofar as they are embodied in goods or people, and that there is no economic justification 
for the common assumption that ideas are transmitted through costless spillovers” (Boldrin and 
Levine (2008)). Goods embodying new idea may mean several things; it could be the new good 
in the strictest sense (like in the model where by buying one good, an agent can become a 
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producer by copying it), or a set of capital tools needed to produce it, or a body of knowledge 
embodied in people and goods needed to replicate the innovation. It lives through the scientist 
team, the engineer team, the production machine blueprints, etc. that generates it and there is 
a significant enough cost to transmit the innovation to someone else so that there is a way for 
the innovators to make a profit. Spillovers can have many consequences on a model, from 
endogenous growth (Atkeson (2007)), to competitive efficiency (Boldrin and Levine (2008)), to 
accruing innovation (Aghion, Harris and Howitt (2000)). Finally as Griliches mentioned: “The 
problem is much more complicated when we realize that we do not deal with one closed 
industry, but with a whole array of firms and industries which “borrow” different amounts of 
knowledge from different sources according to their economic and technological distance from 
them. The concept of such a “distance” is very hard to define empirically.” (Griliches 1998). 
           
 There is also an important body of knowledge that covers the process of diffusion of 
innovations. Rogers (1983) defines diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”. To 
stress the importance of such a conception, one should examine the following contribution of J. 
Mokyr (1990). The author makes the distinction between innovation and invention. For him, an 
invention should be defined as an increment in the set of the total technological knowledge of a 
given society, which is the union of all sets of individual technological knowledge. Therefore, at 
any moment there is a large gap between average and best practice technology; reducing this 
gap by disseminating the techniques used by producers at the cutting edge of knowledge is 
technological progress without invention. Rogers (1983) describes the four main elements 
pertaining to diffusion. First there is the innovation and its characteristics, an obvious bigger 
relative advantage, a better compatibility with previous technologies and less uncertainty 
around it are all factors accelerating the innovation. Uncertainty surrounding an innovation can 
be reduced when it is less complex, has more triability and more observability (as define by 
Rogers). The second one is the communication channel attributes. For example, the more the 
individuals are similar the more the innovation diffuses rapidly. The third element is obviously 
time, Rogers describe the usual impact of time has being S-shaped with a rapid first wave of 
adoption, then a plateau and finally the pacing of late adopters. The last element is the social 
system, which is defined by Rogers as a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint 
problem-solving to accomplish a common goal. This social system is composed of a social 
structure, system norms, opinion leaders and change agents. For more details of this model, 
refer to “Elements of Diffusion” (Rogers (1983)). There are many other factors that can 
accelerate or hinder the rate of diffusion. For example, in the case of financial innovation, 
Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996) investigated the networks and bandwagon effects. The core of 
their hypothesis is that the larger the number of firms that have adopted the innovation, the 
more information about the innovations true cost/return characteristics is available and 
disseminated from adopters and nonadopters, and the greater the number of subsequent 
adoptions by firms, an opinion also shared by Oren and Schwartz (1988) and Chatterjee and 
Eliashber (1989). A synthesis of their paper can be found in the Appendix II. Also, mathematical 
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diffusion models can be used to provide insight into the structure of diffusion processes of 
financial innovations (that is, Mansfield (1961); Floyd (1968); Blackman (1972); Mahajan and 
Peterson (1978); Jeuland (1981); Lilien, Roa, and Kalish (1981); Easingwood, Mahajan, and 
Muller (1983); Mahajan, Wind, and Sharma (1983)). Most of these models are extensions of 
Mansfield (1961) logistic curve model. Von Hippel (1988) contended that the process of 
diffusion is the responsibility of a specific class of consumers he calls “lead users”. According to 
him, long time users are badly equipped to assess new utilisations of a product or new goods 
because they are too much used to the way things already are. He describes lead users as having 
two characteristics: “1) lead users face needs that will be general in a marketplace but hey face 
them months or years before the bulk of that marketplace encounters them, 2) Lead users are 
positioned to benefit significantly by obtaining a solution to those needs”(Von Hippel (1988)). 
The idea behind the concept is that users who expect high rents from a solution to a need under 
study should have been driven by these expectations to attempt to solve their need. This work 
in turn will have produced insight into the need and perhaps useful solutions that will be of 
value to inquiring market researchers. Von Hippel (1988) empirically validated his method by 
observing that users who identified themselves as dissatisfied with existing products were more 
likely to be involved in developing new products responding to their needs. Also, a great mean 
by which innovations are disseminated is the licensing of patents, a process by which a firm or 
individual owning a patent on an innovation allows another party to use the innovation in 
exchange for a monetary benefice. One of many economists studying this concept is Reinganum 
(1989) using game theory and market structure models. The latter states that a key determinant 
explaining why firms might delay the adoption of innovation is a perceived declining adoption 
cost with the number of adopters. There is also a recent phenomenon called patents pools, 
where a group of firms join together all of their patents to get access to everyone else’s one. In 
Scotchmer’s (2004) book, this phenomenon is described thoroughly. Finally, like it was 
mentioned earlier, another way innovations can diffuse is trough the copy process described in 
Boldrin and Levine’s (2008) paper in which once one has bought a good, he possesses everything 
he needs to copy it and become himself a rival of the innovating firm. Of course this model is a 
quite extreme modeling of reality that has many uses in theoretical models such as the one of 
Quah (2002).  
 
Above, the issue of the origin of ideas has been presented; some works also look at the 
question from another point of view. They study the process of creation of ideas and sometimes 
of innovation by itself through the notions of experimentation and imitation. A simple model of 
experimentation is Acemoglu’s (2008) in which the firm receives information about possible 
projects and can decide to experiment any of them at any time. This theoretic game model is 
described in Part II of this survey. This model of sequential information also shares a number of 
common features with the recent work of Bolton and Harris (1999 and 2000) and Keller, Rady 
and Cripps (2005). They describe the experimentation process as follow: firms receive signals 
from projects, the more positive the signal is, the likelier the project will end with an innovation. 
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A type of innovative model where experimentation takes an all other meaning is the 
evolutionary type model.  In this model, there are no profit maximisation, no rational decision 
making, etc. The analogy depicts firms as animals, roaming the jungle of business, “decision 
rules” are genes and the firms with better genes survive. Mutation of those genes through 
innovations occurs by experimentation and natural selection with only the fittest and most 
adaptive firms surviving. A deeper look at these kinds of models will be taken further in the 
survey. “At each instant, a firm can choose one of three possible actions: 1) experiment with a 
project, 2) copy a successful project 3) wait” (Acemoglu (2008)). Present in this quote is a second 
element, imitation, opposite to experimentation but surely as significant. One way this concept 
is modeled was covered when Boldrin and Levine’s (2008) work was described. In the present 
case, imitating a project leads to a higher probability of leading to an innovation. Thus, imitating 
is the other way a rival firm can benefit from a particular firm’s investment in R&D, the other 
way being through the public good or non-perfect appropriability of the technical change. One 
can differentiate spillovers and imitating because imitating is much more in the idea of 
purposeful, strategic copy while spillovers are a more automatic diffusion of it. Another applied 
model of imitation to be seen is the one of Aghion, Harris and Howitt (2000) where firms copy 
each other’s process innovation in a breathtaking competitivity race.  
 
Boldrin and Levine’s (2008) paper also emphasizes the significance of the indivisibility 
attribute of innovation because of its consequences on the optimality of the competitive 
equilibrium. This concept is also presented in the works of Arrow (1962) and many others. 
Indivisibility, as defined by Boldrin and Levine, is “in contrast to other capital goods that can 
often be produced in variable quantities, an idea must generally be produced whole. Two first 
halves of an idea for a drug are certainly not worth the same as the first and second half of the 
idea”. Indivisibility might or might not make a difference for competitive pricing depending on 
multiple factors. When there is no indivisibility, the technology in Boldrin and Levine’s model is a 
convex cone. Thus, by modifying this assumption, indivisibility can sometimes be binding and 
sometimes not. It is also a characteristic which loses its significance with the economic progress 
because a sole idea loses in relative importance. In part II, an application of this concept will be 
presented through the presentation of Boldrin and Levine’s (2008) model. Finally, a notion that 
came back a lot in the lectures preceding this survey was the Hicks neutrality of innovation. Like 
it was mentioned earlier, with the labour reducing bias of technical change, innovation tends to 
modify the capital-labour ratio of production. The concept of Hicks neutrality was first put forth 
in 1932 by John Hicks in his book “The Theory of Wages”. An innovation is considered to be 
Hicks neutral if it does not affect the balance of labour, and capital in the products production 
function. This concept is mostly useful in production function model and for an example of an 




 3. Part 2 The Four Main Groups of Innovative Models 
 
During the research that led to this survey, it was obvious that most of the innovative 
models could fall in one of the four following categories: Industrial organization, production 
function models, macroeconomics and game theory. Industrial organization models mainly 
focus on the firm’s profit maximisation and the influence of institutions on the incentives to 
innovate. Game theory models emphasizes on the interrelations and strategies in an industry, 
production function models concentrate on the effects of innovation and R&D on the 
productivity of firms and finally, macroeconomics models look at the global effects of 
technological progress on economies. Of course, no model is completely included in only one 
category, for example, most of game theory models involve a profit maximisation feature and 
almost all macroeconomic models involve a production function. However, by looking at the 
purpose of the paper, it is most of the time clear in which category a model falls. Also, there are 
some models that do not abide to this taxonomy and do not fall in any of the categories. This 
part of the survey is structured as follow, the main features of each category and the principal 
questions it tries to answer will be presented, and then, a few examples of models related to the 
category will be exposed. For each of the models, there will be a small comparison of the pros 
and cons of the model with the contribution of Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelps (2011).  
 
3.1 Industrial Organization  
  
The main premise of the Industrial Organization models lies with the basic idea of the (v, 
c, p) concept already described. Entrepreneurs face a pool containing all available ideas mankind 
ever had and will ever have. This is what Mokyr (1990) called metatechnological knowledge. If 
all these ideas were valuable at the moment, they would all be developed in innovations 
instantly. Since, proponents of this category emphasizes the profit maximisation process, the 
main purpose of their study is about ways to stimulate the incentives to innovate through 
institutions, intellectual property and market structure. Examples of topics investigated by them 
are patent races (which is also a common subject of game theorists), first mover advantage, 
monopolistic competition, intellectual property etc.  The theory behind intellectual property 
rights is quite relevant because in order to patent an innovation the patent office must have a 
definition of what it is. Scotchmer (2004) in her book gives the 4 attributes a technological 
change must have to be patentable. First the object must concern a patentable subject matter, 
to do so, it must be a machine, a manufactured product, a composition made from two or more 
substances or a process for manufacturing objects. In recent years, this requirement has 
widened to include; computer code, life forms, management techniques, financial assets, etc. 
The second attribute is utility -- that is, an invention must offer some positive benefit to society. 
The third and four attributes are novelty and non-obviousness, they are self-explaining.   
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 Let us start by re-exploring the (v, c, p) model described above because it is really the 
core of the industrial organization methodology. The version presented here is mostly the one 
of Scotchmer’s book “Innovation and Incentives” (2004). Let us recall that the form (v, c, p) is a 
triplet where v is the social value or the per period consumer’s surplus with competitive supply 
of the innovation, c is the cost of developing and commercializing the idea and p is the 
probability that a certain way to “discover” the innovation succeeds. This last notion is implicit 
in many patent races models where each firm tries to be the first to create the innovation. Also, 
if the social value is eternal and the supply is competitive, the discounted social value of the 
innovation is thus v/r, the profit per period is generally seen as a proportion of the social value 
    with    being between 0 and 1. If the patent or the innovation has a finite lifetime of T 
periods, then the total profit from it for the innovator or the entrepreneur would be       
 . This creative environment is present in many works: Green and Scotchmer (1995), 
O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), etc. It has the advantages of having a clean 
separation between the exogenous process that generates ideas for innovations through a form 
of serendipity and the decision whether to invest in them. However its major flaw is that it 
considers only a vague notion of objective risk and completely ignores the largely accepted 
presence of Knightian uncertainty. For the instance, how does one calculate the value of v or p? 
How can one assess the value of an innovation before it is completed?     
 
Scotchmer (2004) seminal book often mentioned before is utterly representative of the 
industrial organization approach. While the book covers many topics and many models, this 
section will try to expose the major ones.  The first interesting model involves the (v,c,p)  
construct. It aims at exploring how patents can help choosing the best option among two 
innovation ideas. Suppose that two firms have substitute ideas (       i = 1, 2, p = 1 that are 
similar enough such that only one can be patented, because the other one would be infringing. 
Firm 1 idea is better if 
  
 
       
  
 
     but in order to identify the better idea, information 
about both v’s and c’s must be aggregated and compared. However, to do so is most of the time 
practically impossible. According to Scotchmer (2004), a patent system will not generally 
aggregate the information and will not necessarily limit investment to the best idea. For a 
patent of length T the firm’s prospective patent reward is     . Therefore, there are two 
possible outcomes in this situation, both of which may be inefficient. If the patent values are 
high enough, both firms may enter a patent race, each winning with probability one-half. This 
case implies large duplication cost which are most of the times inefficient, except when the 
project is uncertain (the case where p is smaller than one) where having two firms investing for 
the main idea reduces the time before the innovation becomes available. On the other side, if 
the patent values are relatively low, then it may be that only one firm enters the race, but there 
is no guarantee that it will be the right firm because it cannot evaluate whether its prospective 
innovation will provide more surplus at a lower cost than that of the rival. Thus, it results from 
this simple industrial organization model that patents are rather inefficient. To solve this 
conundrum, Scotchmer (2004) in chapter 2 explores multiple contests solution like a simple 
commitment to pay, a Vickrey Auction (second price) or a prototype contest. A prototype 
22 
 
contest gives the firms the possibility to demonstrate their ideas by developing prototypes and 
then choosing among them the most efficient (as define earlier). Of course this contest has a 
high cost in duplicated investments and the sponsor still needs a commitment to pay ex post, 
avoiding the temptation to negotiate a low price once the prototypes are delivered.   If the 
sponsor cannot commit to pay a price above development cost the innovators will not invest, 
even when the innovation would be socially desirable.  
 
The second relevant model of the book “Innovation and Incentives” is one pertaining to 
how profitable intellectual rights should be. Even if “it is tempting to think that strengthening 
intellectual property rights is always a good idea if it leads to more innovation. That view is 
short-sighted” (Scotchmer (2004)). The author gives two reason why this is true. First, strong 
intellectual property rights increase the deadweight loss (inherent in all forms of monopoly) on 
innovation, even those that would be forthcoming with weaker rights. Second, strong 
intellectual property rights lead to an inefficient duplication of R&D costs as more firms vie for 
possession of those rights. Suppose that the ideas space can be represented by the figure in 
appendix 3 (Scotchmer (2004 p.99)), each idea (v, c) can be represented as a point in the space. 
Remember that the intellectual property protection provides profit equal to    , the thick line 
on the graph. The profit thus depends on v and T. All ideas being under the line are profitable 
enough for investment. Suppose now that T is augmented, the line rotate counter clockwise and 
more ideas become profitable. However, the lengthening of the patent also includes a raise of 
the deadweight loss and thus reduces v. If the deadweight loss is             then the idea 
social value would be  
 
 
     .  Duration is not the only policy lever available to government to 
tune incentives. The breadth of a patent defines the limit another invention must not cross to 
not infringe the patent and thus to be expose to lawsuits. To widen or reduce the breadth of the 
patent varies   and therefore moves the line the same way T does. It also involves the same 
deadweight loss. The choice of the best policy is a very convoluted question. Gallini (1992) uses 
a ratio test in order to compare long and thin patents with short and wide ones.  
 
 The last model taken from Scotchmer’s (2004) book that will be presented in this section 
is a patent race because they are representative of both industrial organization treatment of 
innovation and of the utilisation of the (v, c, p) construct. A patent race occurs when multiple 
firms pursue the same targeted invention or similar inventions with each one infringing on the 
others potential patent. Therefore, only one firm will receive the intellectual property right. 
Clearly, patents race increase the probability of innovation when inventors have different ideas 
for how to solve a targeted problem and it also accelerates progress as it will be shown. Let P(n) 
be the probability that at least one firm succeeds in each period when there are n firms 
participating, P(n) being strictly increasing in n. Suppose also that each firm will continue to race 
in successive periods until one succeeds, and that the cost in each period is the same.  It follows 
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that the expected time to discovery is 1/P(n) =               
    
   . The value of the 
discovery must be discounted from the time it occurs. Thus, if we define   as the value of the 
patent at the time of the discovery, the expected discount value of   is    
 
   
             
          
    
   
  
      
   
 
   
  
    
       
 
    in a similar way, the expected cost to n firms that 
remain in the race until there is a success is 
  
      
 (see Scotchmer (2004 chapter 4)). Therefore, 
the total expected profit for all firms together is 
        
      
 and the individual profit is  
 
 
       
      
. 
Assuming there is no barriers to entry or exit, there will be firms entering the race until 
             . In this simple model, firms do not choose their R&D investments which 
could influence the likelihood of innovation this period. In the game theory section, a more 
complex race patent with elaborate strategies will be presented. Since            
 
     
 
 
    
 
, a patent race accelerates innovation. 
 
They are many more industrial organization models presented in Scotchmer‘s book such as 
a model showing how licensing and a fixed cost can help to produce proprietary products 
efficiently (Chapter 6) or a model using the triplet construct and deriving from its implication the 
optimal number of entrepreneurs/firms in a patent race or more widely on an innovation 
endeavour (Chapter 4). Clearly the simplistic approach of summarizing the innovation process 
with three variables does not have any of the theoric possibilities the Amarante, Ghossoub and 
Phelps theory has. It is perfect to study innovation from a profit maximisation angle but it does 
not really define what an innovation is and it does not at all assess the role of uncertainty. 
However, one way one could maybe cope with these flaw would be to substitute the p of (v, c, 
p) with a non-additive probability or a appropriate capacity which would introduce the 
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the innovation process. Also, there is still the question of 
the exogeneity of the provenance of the innovation since in most industrial organization 
models, firms can just decide whether or not to participate in the race or in the development 
effort.  
 
Another author saw earlier that would enlist in the industrial organisation category would 
be Von Hippel (1988) and his functional source of innovation theory. The author’s theory 
stipulates that innovators could be categorized according to their functional relationship 
through which they derive benefit from a given product, process or service innovation. What the 
author observes is that the source (being users, manufacturers or suppliers) greatly varies from 
an industry to another. Let us also recall that the author’s explanation for the great variation in 
the source of technological change arise from his analysis of the temporary profits (economic 
rents) expected by potential innovators. A successful innovator’s rent may come in the form of 
cost savings and/or increased prices and/or increased sales obtainable during his period of 
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temporary and partial monopoly. Thus, he contends that one could predict the most likely 
source of a future innovation by looking at which functional category would most likely benefit 
from it. However, the ability to predict the functional sources of innovation on the basis of firms’ 
preinnovation expectations of rents requires that correlation exist between such expectations 
and the functional role of innovating firms. More specifically, two conditions must hold:  
1) It must be difficult (expensive) for innovators to adopt new functional relationships to 
their innovations: “If role switching were frequent or inexpensively accomplished, 
innovators might switch to the functional role that offered them the best innovation-
related return. And, under such conditions, we would only be able to predict the 
functional locus of innovation in a weak sense, that is, “the developer of x innovation 
will become a user” rather than able to make the stronger statement “the developer of 
x innovation will be a firm or individual that currently is a member of the user 
community” ” (Von Hippel (1988)). There are two reasons why one could believe that 
functional switching is not common: i) as can be seen in the case data contained in the 
appendix of Von Hippel’s book, role switching occurred in only a few instances in the 
samples examined. ii) The switching of functional roles appears to be often both difficult 
and expensive because of specialisation.  
2) Innovators must have a poor ability to capture rent by licensing their innovation-related 
knowledge to others :  an innovator should have only two routes toward capturing rents 
from an innovation : (1) exploiting the innovation himself while preventing others from 
doing so; (2) licensing others to use this innovation-related knowledge for a fee. Ability 
to license efficiently, however, allows an innovator in any functional locus to (in a sense) 
tax licensees in different functional loci according to their differing abilities to benefit, 
thus diminishing the crucial differences (specialisation) stated in condition 1.  
For condition two to hold, Von Hippel needs to show that patents and trade secrets legislation 
are not effective to protect one’s intellectual property and thus licensing is not a problem. In 
order to do so the author refer to many studies such as the one from Levine et al. (1984) and the 
seminal one by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) (which results are available in appendix 4), 
among others. Since most of the studies show that the majority of entrepreneurs prefer other 
mechanisms than patents and licensing, Von Hippel concludes that both conditions generally 
hold. The following step in the author’s empirical model was to test the relationship between 
the functional source of innovation and expected innovation rents. His general strategy for 
estimating rents that firms might reasonably expect if they were to develop specific types of 
innovation was to study several innovation categories in detail and to try to understand the 
thinking of and options open to potential innovators in these fields. Innovators capture 
temporary rents from their successful innovations by first establishing some type of monopoly 
control over their innovation and then using this control to increase their economic return. Von 
Hippel then proceeds to five empirical case studies each using tests of reason that show the 
validity of his assumptions. A test of reason is the comparison of the data on the sources of 
innovation with the ranking he made from an empirical analysis of the expected economic rents 
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of each of the possible source. The author concludes that he can see two general reasons why 
the rent expectations of potential innovators could differ significantly as a consequence of the 
functional relationship they hold to an innovation opportunity. First, the abilities of firms to 
protect and benefit from identical innovation-related information can differ as a consequence of 
functional role and the second one has to do with the industry competitive structure. Firms 
having user, manufacturer and supplier relationships to a given innovation often come from 
different industries. These industries may have different structures (concentration, competition, 
legislation, etc.) and thus different expectation on the potential economic rent. 
 
Boldrin and Levine are two of the major theorist of innovation. Because they approach the 
phenomenon from different angles, they will appear two times in this part, the first one here in 
the industrial organization section and another time in the macroeconomics section. The model 
presented here is drawn from their book “Boldrin and Levine Against Intellectual Monopoly” 
(2008). The premises of this book is that innovation are not disembodied objects, they live 
through the scientific or engineer team that developed it or through the blueprints. In either 
way, it takes time and money to be transferred to another team or plant. Since the 
communication of ideas is costly they are not perfectly non-exclusive and thus inventors can 
make a profit large enough to cover their costs even in the absence of intellectual property. 
They stray from the mainstream because instead of considering the cost of producing an idea as 
a fixed cost, they emphasize that it is similar to producing any other capital good. The book also 
broach innovation’s attributes such as indivisibility and public good and their consequences on 
equilibrium and modeling. Indivisibility occurs because in contrast to other capital foods that 
can often be produced in variable quantities, an idea must generally be produced whole. In their 
model, one has to assume that an invention has already taken place. In other words, there is 
currently a single copy of all that is needed to reproduce the innovation whether it is the first 
copy of the product, the engineer team or the blueprint. Let us suppose that every subsequent 
item produced through this template is a perfect substitute for the first template itself and also 
that an item requires only a copy of itself and no other inputs to be reproduced. At any moment 
in time, any resource has two alternative uses: consumption or reproduction. They also assume 
that there is no other cost of producing copies. Therefore, as soon as the first unit is sold, the 
innovator is possibly in competition with his customers. This is the case where there is 
absolutely no intellectual property whatsoever. The rent of the innovator is then derived 
through the ordinary theory of perfectly competitive equilibrium. Boldrin and Levine suppose 
that there are currently k>0 units of the product available and that independently of how many 
of these units are consumed during the current period,     units of the same product will be 
available tomorrow, with    . The value of K units of the good to a representative consumer 
is u(k) , where u is strictly increasing, concave, and bounded below. This infinitely lived 
representative consumer discounts the future with the discount factor      . The authors 
also assume that the technology and preferences are such that feasible utility is bounded above. 
As is standard in the theory of competitive equilibrium, the price of consumption is determined 
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by marginal utility     
       
     . Similarly the price    of the durable good    can be 
computed, it is just the present value of future prices at which the good will sell.  
        
           
         
 
   
 
   
 
In other words, even when forced to compete with many other people all with access to the 
same reproduction technology, the initial owner of the resource will earn the present value of 
all future sales of the good. Under the assumption of positive marginal utility     , and so it 
must be that      for all t. Hence, even without intellectual monopoly, and in the face of 
fierce competition of purchasers, innovations always command profits. In this case, the price of 
the idea decreases at a speed that depends on the ratio between          and  
         . The 
authors then conclude that “This simple analysis clarifies that competitive rents can be 
substantial and that there is no question that innovation can occur under conditions of perfect 
competition” (Boldrin and Levine (2008)). However, introducing the first unit of the new good 
entails some cost C > 0 for the innovator, thus the innovation will be produced if C<    which is 
the price of the initial unit sold in a competitive market. They do not address the question 
whether a socially valuable innovation that would be developed under monopoly is possibly 
overlooked in competitive markets. The remainder of the book considers expansions of this 
model. For example cases where the reproduction technology increases, where the good is 
perishable or where there is a reproduction cost are analysed. However all these developments 
respect the basic intuition presented in the model above and thus its presentation covers the 
aim of this survey which is to expose the principles of different innovation modeling. One should 
refer to the Boldrin and Levine’s (2008) book for a more complete analysis. The conclusion of 
the authors is that “Trivial ideas are cheap to communicate, but of course they are also cheap to 
create. Complex ideas are expensive to create, but they are also difficult to communicate, so 
they are scarce and will command a substantial premium for a long period of time”. Even if 
there is a small part on ideas of uncertain value which is more precisely a measure of risk rather 
than uncertainty as defined by Knight, this book, as much of the industrial organization works, 
does not consider this aspect of innovation. Also the other common flaw of pervasive 
exogeneity is present. We can thus classify this model as a proper profit maximisation approach 
to innovation and a good champion of competitive markets as generators of innovation but with 
a relatively limited theorical contribution.   
 
3.2 Production functions 
 
 The early attempts of economists to model technological change was based on 
production function models in which the output (Y) of an economic unit (a firm, a country, an 
industry, etc.) is represented simply as a function of capital (K), labor (L) and a form or another 
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of a productivity or technological level measure (A) :                     The most 
common example is the Cobb-Douglas production function with  linear productivity : 
        
    
    
This formalization of the theory led, in the early 1960s, to a lot of papers where researchers 
estimated empirically matters such as the impact of investments in R&D on productivity growth, 
under the implicit assumption that R&D is an input into innovation and innovation leads to 
technological change. To do so, authors estimated the total factor productivity (TFP) which is the 
remainder of output growth that is not explained by growth of labour or capital. Of course, 
those estimations are rather imprecise because then the TFP encloses much more than just 
technological progress. The innovation conceptualization implicit in the approach of this 
category is also quite simplistic. There are no such things as imagination or exogenous constraint 
to innovation, as long as the economic unit is pouring money in R&D, the productivity increases. 
A good example of such a model is presented in Nordhaus’ (1969) book “Invention, Growth and 
Welfare” where the function       expands to include also a proportion of the rivals’ level of 
technology in a spillover model. It also states a common assumption which is that       is being 
concave in A. Whether or not this assumption is realistic regarding the recent data is unclear. A 
seminal as well as global study on the subject was performed by Griliches in his 1998 paper. The 
author combine the basic model developed above, using a Cobb-Douglas production function 
and also combining it with a model of spillovers as described earlier. The main observation of 
Griliches was the difficulty to distinguish the real effect of R&D investments from the other 
factors. He describes three major issues in the measurement of a knowledge capital:  
1) The fact that the research and development process takes time and that 
current research and development may not have an effect on measured 
productivity until several years have elapsed forces one to make assumptions 
about the relevant lag structure. 
2)  Past research and development investments depreciate and become 
obsolete. Thus the growth in the net “stock” of research and development 
capital is not equal to the gross level of current or recent resources invested in 
expanding it. 
3) The level of knowledge in any one sector or industry not only is derived from 
“own” research and development investments but also is affected by the 
knowledge borrowed or stolen from other sectors or industries. Thus, the 
productivity of industry i will depend also on the research and development 
investments of industries j and h, among others. 
 
 Let us quickly review some of the major papers who’s model fall into this category. In 
first comes the knowledge capital model of firm productivity used by Ericson and Pakes (1995). 
In this paper, the active force is an entrepreneur/firm exploring a speculative idea; a perceived 
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profit opportunity in some industry. The quantity of investment, together with parameters 
describing the evolution of the market and the competition, determine the distribution of 
outcomes form the exploratory activities of an active firm in each period. Suppose that the only 
distinction among firms is their achieved state of “success” (index of efficiency,    , n 
exploiting it.   is a measure relative to the rest of the industry well-fare. Therefore, a higher   
indicates that the firm is in a stronger position relatively to the rest of the industry. Hence,   is 
dependent on the firm’s investment decision and on autonomous factors shifting the demand or 
cost parameters of all firms in the industry. Let us denote the industry structure at any point of 
time by              
 ; s provides the number of firms at each possible   state. Thus, the 
state couple, (   ), determines the entire distribution of the firm’s current and future profits. 
Ericson and Pakes also assume that the firm’s profit is decreasing (weakly) in s and increasing 
(weakly) in  . There is a set of states,      at which new firms may enter the industry after 
making a sufficient investment. The firm’s level of investment in R&D is denoted by        is 
chosen to maximize the expected present discounted value of profits of all information available 
at t. The authors assume “this information to include the history of all past states and of the 
firm’s own past investment decision, the current state and the probability laws governing the 
evolution of that state over time, including the law governing the impact of the firm’s own 
investment on that evolutionary pattern”.  Each period, the firms has a probability, increasing in 
its investment expenditures, to access a better state and a probability to access a worst state, 
following the stochastic process :           (the probability of shifhting into state    
conditional on being in state   and investing x. The profit function is                
       . From these basics and many more technical constructs and technical assumptions the 
authors build the decision sets and maximisation problems for both the incumbent in the 
market and the potential new firm/entrepreneur entering the market. From there, they derive a 
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for the optimal actions of all agents. The dynamics and 
solutions are however exterior to this survey because not relevant to the innovation process and 
one should refer to the Ericson and Pakes (1995) paper for more details.  
 
One can see from this model that innovation in this context is “a source of continuous 
dynamic competitive pressure that forces all firms in the industry to struggle to maintain profits 
and survive” (Ericson and Pakes (1995)).  This aspect of the theory was missing in the industrial 
organization approach and is nicely modeled here. To summarize the model and emphasize 
points not clearly enunciate in the above paragraph, let us recall that in this model a 
firm/entrepreneur already in the industry or contemplating entering it, has a speculative 
innovation idea he projects to develop. However, this agent cannot know ex-ante the value of 
this idea relatively to the achieved standards of the industry. It must be tried and have time, 
money and effort invested before competitiveness of the idea can be precisely known. 
Therefore, knightian uncertainty fits perfectly well in this environment but is never dealt with. 
There is no way presented in this model in which the entrepreneur could share the 
risk/uncertainty he faces, he must bear it all on his shoulder. This must be why the entrepreneur 
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discounts his expected profit and do not use a form of expected utility. Also, it is assumed that 
the entering entrepreneur can always have the funds necessary to do so. Clearly, those two 
flaws could be corrected by an approach based on the one by Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelps 
(2011). However, the depth and subtleties of the mechanics present in this model should not be 
overlooked. The dynamic of the ongoing stochastic innovation process is also surely an 
interesting contribution worth a deeper look. 
 
 The next model is another one from Boldrin and Levine, it is not drawn from one of their 
papers but rather from a course they gave. It has many applications in macroeconomics and is 
greatly interesting by its use of a production function innovation which is of the factor saving 
type already mentioned. The main characteristic of this type of model is its straying from the 
classic hicksian neutrality because by definition an innovation in those models aim at altering 
the input mix for a given level of output. Indeed, a labor-saving technological change results in a 
higher capital-to-labor ratio; a capital-saving technological change leads to a lower capital-to-
labor ratio; and a neutral technological change results in an unchanged capital-to-labor ratio.  
Link in his 2007 paper emphasizes that input-saving technological change “implicitly assumes 
that technology leads to cost reducing changes in the production process, rather than to new or 
improved quality products”. In Boldrin and Levine model, consumption is produced by activities 
using labour and capital as inputs, capital is produced from capital and labour reproduces itself. 
The particularity of the model is that capital comes in an infinite sequence of different qualities. 
The production function is         where k is an infinite vector of different quality capital and 
l a scalar denoting labour. Labour requirement diminishes with the quality of capital. Like in an 
endogenous growth model where human-capital accumulation is determined endogenously, the 
agent maximising utility in this model has to decide between two alternatives for using his 
investments. He can choose to reproduce capital or to improve it. Under the usual assumptions 
on the utility function and the production function, the agent maximises its utility under its 
resource constraints in order to reach the competitive equilibrium. Boldrin and Levine then 
derive and prove an extended version of the Welfare and Existence theorems. This framework 
describes one of the most common ideas about innovation, the intuition that it is driven by the 
exogenous constraint imposed by nature. Mankind creativity reacts to exterior factor. For 
example, if it were the capital prices that were high, one can also imagine a model where 
innovation in management or somewhere else would change the labor-capital ratio the other 
way, the sense of the innovation being driven by fluctuations of the inputs price. This method 
will also be revisited from a different angle in the endogenous growth section of the next 
category. 
 
 Finally, there are many more examples of production function models but it would be 
too long to expose them all. However, some of them are worth being summarized. The Aghion, 
Harris and Howitt (2000) step-by-step model of innovation suppose that two firms producing 
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substitute goods compete in an industry. Each firm produces using labor as the only input, 
according to a constant returns production function, and takes the wage rate as given. A firm 
engages in R&D in order to decrease its relative cost. Each time a firm’s technology advances by 
one step, its unit labor requirement falls by a factor    . Thus, the relative cost of a firm i that 
leads its rival by n steps is 
  
  
       . Innovative advance happens at a rate determined by R&D 
efforts which increase the likelihood of an advance at each period, the authors use a Poisson 
distribution to model this process in their paper. Agion and al. (2000) use this framework to 
study many phenomena such as spillovers, catching up and the effect of competition on 
innovation. The latter will be discussed again in the conclusion. They also differentiate the cases 
of very small and very large innovation the latter being the case where the maximum 
permissible lead is one step and it gives an advantage so big that it automatically leads to a 
complete monopole, until the rival catches up. Also, there is the model presented in Shell’s 1966 
paper where invention enters the production function the same way as capital or labour inputs :  
               , with the growth in the stock of technical knowledge satistfies the 
differential equation             , where       is the fraction of output currently 
devoted to invention and   is the proportion of inventions that are successful because according 
to Shell “ invention is a particularly risky form of social investment. In my model, a given fraction 
of inventions is "successful," thus removing the difficult decision problems associated with 
uncertainty (risk)”. One can see that the nuance between risk and uncertainty is seldom made. 
The last term (  ) represents the obsolescence property of invention. This decay in technical 
knowledge is possibly caused by the imperfect transmission of technical information from one 
generation of the labour force to the next. The author then uses this model to explore matters 
such as the public good property and hicksian neutrality and their consequences. To conclude, 
all these production function models also have limited theorical applications because of the 
simplicity of their construction. Indeed, in them innovation is nothing more than a parameter of 
a function. This can hardly lead to a theory of the entrepreneur decision process. However, most 
of them are interesting by the dynamics of the innovation process rather than by the 
conceptualization of the technological progress in itself.   
 
3.3 Macroeconomics and economic history 
  
The premises of this category are quite wider than those of the latter ones. To take a 
look at, for example, the factors listed by Mokyr (1990) in his book, one will see that the 
incentive factor promoted by the Industrial organization is only one in many others that 
macroeconomics and historian economics study. The approaches of macroeconomics and 
economical history are together in this section because most of the lectures made on the latter 
explained historical technological evolution through the utilisation of macroeconomics models. 
The core of the theoretical work done on innovation by macroeconomist pertains to the 
productivity of production. This concept is often described by the total factor productivity 
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concept (TFP) which has already been defined when describing the empirical research last 
section. Many models and theories described earlier in this survey could enter this section. Also 
in Mokyr’s book “The lever of riches: technological creativity and economic progress” (1990), 
the following definition of innovation used by macroeconomists is given: “By technological 
progress I mean any change in the application of information to the production process in such a 
way as to increase efficiency, resulting either in the production of a given output with fewer 
resources or the production of better or new products”. He also adds that in most economical 
theories, a rational agent maximizes his utility under constraints and thus can do nothing about 
theses constraints.  However, technical changes are an attack to the limits because it pushes 
back what is attainable. As mentioned he also lays down his stimulating factors, a few have 
already been mentioned earlier. The point is that there is no formal modeling in his work, only 
an analysis of the macroeconomic factors which can hinder or boost innovation. Still, there are 
some relevant facts that are worth mentioning, especially about the dynamics of invention. 
Mokyr questions the use of the usual equilibrium toolkit to analyse technological change, 
obviously because, as it will be exposed in the next models presentation, innovation is most of 
the time the exterior factor that disturbs the inertia of equilibrium. A number of historians and 
an economist had therefore suggested using a concept of evolution to describe the dynamic 
aspects of technological progress. A good example of that is the evolutionary model of 
innovation of Nelson and Winter (1982) presented below.  Historical analysis lack theoretical 
foundations and are therefore not longer discussed. Hence, let us step in the presentation of 
some representative innovation modeling in a macroeconomic framework. 
 
 Probably the first formal macroeconomic model involving innovation, the Solow growth 
model is well known and therefore do not need to be expose here. The Solow model assumes an 
exogenous productivity factor that influence production through the production function. It has 
already been exposed that this productivity factor (usually the    in              ) can be 
defined as growing regularly or through a stochastic process. However, an application of this 
framework that emphasizes more the role of the inventive process, like the one found in the 
Boldrin and Levine work, tries to endogeneize the technology progression. The premise of such 
theories is that “technical advance comes from things that people do not merely a function of 
elapsed calendar time” (Romer (1994)). The Boldrin and Levine model is only one in many 
attempts to do this. Let us now present some other types of such endeavours. First, there is the 
Hoon and Phelps model of their 2011 paper in which they study policy shocks in an endogenous 
product innovation model. They assume that the homogenous final good is produced 
competitively by assembling a range of produced intermediate inputs according to the 
production function       
  
 
     with alpha being between 0 and 1. Q is the output of the 
final good and    is the quantity of intermediate input i, and n is the number indicating how 
many types of intermediate inputs are present. They also assume that no labor is directly 
required to produce the final good. There is another sector, characterized by monopolistic 
competition, which produces a range intermediate inputs with only labor. Developing a new 
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variety of the intermediate input requires R&D costs in labor wages. There is also a spillover 
effect and a research good (    which both lead to the effective number of units of labor 
required to the development of a new design being     . Thus the R&D cost to produce a new 
product is given by        where  
  denotes the labour wage. Once the design of an 
intermediate input has been developed, the firm faces a constant marginal production cost. 
Provided this environment, the authors then derive the competitive equilibrium and the labor 
supply and demand for the two cases of a small economy and of a closed economy. Using their 
parameters Hoon and Phelps (2011) also derive conditions (on alpha and r) the economy must 
satisfy in order to generate innovations. The two policy shocks studied with this framework are 
an introduction of R&D subsidy financed by consumption tax and an introduction of payroll tax 
to maintain higher debt-to-GDP ratio. They show that policies can have significant effects on 
employment and innovation’s rate. This model is also a good example of the standing on the 
shoulder of giants’ effect, meaning that later innovations can benefit from a larger stock of ideas 
thus requiring less R&D labor input to create a new idea, or an economy that has been growing 
more rapidly in the past demands less labor input now to create a given flow of new ideas.  
 
Another model of endogenous technological change can be found in the paper of Romer 
(1986) which presents a fully specified model of long run growth in which knowledge is assumed 
to be an input in production that has increasing marginal productivity. In contrast to physical 
capital that can be produced one for one from forgone output, new knowledge is assumed to be 
the product of a research technology that exhibits diminishing returns. There is also a usual 
spillover effect in this model. He considers a two period model where each of the S identical 
consumers have a twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave utility function          
defined over the consumption of a single good in each period. Let the consumers be given an 
initial endowment of the output goods in period one. The author also suppose that production 
of the consumption goods in period 2 is a function of the state of knowledge, denoted by k, and 
a set of additional factors such as physical capital, labor, etc. denoted by the vector x. Those 
other factors are assumed fixed in order to focus the analysis on the technological dimension. k 
will be treated as a stock of disembodied knowledge, i.e., knowledge in books. If one wants to 
assume that all knowledge is embodied in some kind of tangible capital such as conventional 
physical capital or human capital, k can be reinterpreted throughout as a composite good made 
up of both knowledge and the tangible capital good.  Assume that there is a research technology 
that produces knowledge from forgone consumption in period 1. The spillover effect is modeled 
by representing the technology of firm i in terms of a twice continuously differentiable 
production function F that depends on the firm specific inputs           and on the aggregate 
level of knowledge in the economy (      
 
    with N firms in the economy). In order to 
guaranty the existence of equilibrium, F must be assumed concave. By adding homogeneity to 
the function F, it follows that it exhibits increasing return to scale. To strengthen this result, the 
author also assumes that F exhibit global increasing marginal productivity of knowledge from a 
social point of view. Hence, the equilibrium for the two periods model is a standard competitive 
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equilibrium with externalities. After solving for the firms and consumers maximization problem, 
Romer (1986) then extends its model to infinite horizons. This simple model shows the most 
basic way macroeconomics has modeled innovation. It can be easily expanded to introduce risk 
by introducing a parameter defining a proportion of invested consumption that turn into 
knowledge. However, because of its minimal description of states and choice spaces, it would be 
hard to introduce uncertainty or a financier agent.  
 
The last of the macroeconomic endogenous technological growth model to be 
presented in this survey is the one by Lucas (1988). In fact, this paper contains three models, 
one emphasizing capital accumulation and technological change, one emphasizing human 
capital accumulation and one covering specialized human capital accumulation through learning 
by doing. The first of these models is used by Lucas to assess the validity of the neoclassical 
theory to account for innovation using the ordinary macroeconomic model where technology 
enters a Cobb-Douglas like production function, while growing by a fixed exogenous parameter 
through time. As he conclude “it is not exactly wrong to describe these differences by an 
exogenous, exponential term like A(t) neither is it useful to do so. We want a formalism that 
leads us to think about individual decisions to acquire knowledge, and about the consequences 
of these decisions for productivity. The body of theory that does this is called the theory of 
'human capital', and I am going to draw extensively on this theory in the remainder of these 
lectures” (Lucas (1988)). Throughout this survey it has been clear that modern economics theory 
approach has two main flaws. The first one is its inability to deal with knightian uncertainty. The 
second one is the pervasive exogeneity of the innovation process. Lucas’s answer for the second 
one is therefore the human capital theory. Here is how he applies it to the question. The 
premise of human capital theory is the fact that the way an individual allocates his time over 
various activities in the current period affects his productivity, or his h(t) level, in future periods. 
Suppose there are N workers, with skill levels h ranging from 0 to infinity. There are also N(h) 
workers with the skill level h so that          
 
 
. Suppose a worker with skill h devotes the 
fraction u(h) of his non-leisure time to current production, and the remaining 1 - u( h) to human 
capital accumulation. Then the effective workforce in production is the sum 
               
 
 
 of the skill-weighted manhours devoted to current production. Thus if 
output as a function of total capital K and effective labor    is       
     the hourly wage of a 
worker at skill h is       
    and his total earnings are       
       . Lucas also adds a 
spillover effect by taking into account the average level skill or human capital    
        
 
 




that will enter the production function                               
 , where A is still 
the technology level but is now constant. The human capital is acquired through the following 
equation                     where G is increasing and G(0) = 0. Lucas then proceeds to 
the resolution of the competitive equilibrium. By solving the matter of exogeneity this way, 
Lucas strays away from the concepts of innovation, nonetheless, there might be the beginning 




Atkeson’s (2007) paper presents present a general equilibrium model of the decisions of 
firms to innovate and to engage in international trade. The question he tries to answer is: How 
has the expansion of opportunities for international trade changed firms’ incentives to engage in 
innovative activities? To do so, he describes a model with the two kinds of innovation already 
mentioned: product and process innovations. It is closely related to several papers in the 
literature, Hopenhayn’s (1992) model in which firms’ experience exogenous random shocks to 
their productivity, Luttmer (2006), Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006), etc. Let us suppose a 
discrete time environment with two countries (home and foreign). The households in each 
country are endowed with L units of time. Production is structured as follow, there is a single 
final nontraded good that can be consumed or used in innovative activities, a continuum of 
differentiated intermediate goods that are produced and can be internationally traded subject 
to a fixed and a variable trade cost, and a nontraded intermediate good that is called the 
research good. This research good is produced using a combination of final output and labor, 
and is used to pay the costs associated with process and product innovation, as well as the fixed 
costs of exporting. The productivities of the firms producing the differentiated intermediate 
goods are determined endogenously through equilibrium process innovation, and the measure 
of differentiated intermediate goods produced in each country is determined endogenously 
through product innovation. Households in the home country have preferences of the form 
      
         
 
    (the foreign households have similar preferences but consumption is 
denoted   
 ) and they face an intertemporal budget relatively to their endowments 
                
 
    where    are intertemporal prices,   is the wage in home country, 
   is the price of the home final good and   is the initial stock of assets held by the household. 
Intermediate goods are differentiated products each produced by heterogeneous firms indexed 
by z, which indicates their productivity. A firm in the home country with productivity index z has 
productivity equal to        
 
     and produces output       with labor       according to the 
CRS production technology:              
 
         . The output of this firm can be used in the 
production of the home final good, with the quantity of this domestic absorption denoted      . 
Alternatively, some of this output can be exported to the foreign country to be used in the 
production of the foreign final good. The home final good is produced from home and foreign 
intermediate goods with a constant returns production technology of the form :  
          
               
         
        
               
where      is the measure of operating firms in the home country with productivity less than 
or equal to z. The author then solves for the competitive equilibrium of both the foreign and 
home country. The research good in the home country is produced with a constant returns to 
scale production technology F that uses    units of the home final good and     units of labor 
to produce     units of the research good according to      = F (  ,    ). Productivity at the 
firm level evolves over time depending both on idiosyncratic productivity shocks hitting the firm 
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and on the level of investment in productivity improvements undertaken within the firm. 
Productivity at the firm level evolves over time depending both on idiosyncratic productivity 
shocks hitting the firm and on the level of investment in productivity improvements undertaken 
within the firm. We model the evolution of firm productivity as follows. At the beginning of each 
period t, every existing firm has probability δ of exiting exogenously, and corresponding 
probability 1 − δ of surviving to produce. A surviving firm with current productivity       
 
    , 
and that invests H (z, p) = h exp(z) c(p) units of the research good in improving its productivity in 
the current period t, has probability p of having productivity          
 
     and probability 1 − 
p of having productivity          
 
     in the next period t+1. They assume that c(p) is 
increasing and convex in p, and h is a positive constant. New firms (or new products) are created 
with investments of the research good. Investment of    units of the research good in period t 
yield a new firm in period t+1 with initial productivity        
 
     drawn from a distribution 
over z given by G. Therefore, the product innovation and process innovation decision can be 
solved with Bellman equations (this survey being more interested by the mechanics by which 
innovation is modeled, one should refer to the paper for a complete resolution of the model). 
This model is a great contribution to the innovation theory because of the creative way by which 
it is modeling different aspects of the inventive process. Product innovation, process innovation, 
spillovers, stochastic shocks to productivity and endogeneity are all present as well as, for the 
first time, an international sector.  
 
Finally, there are two opposite theories about innovation, one who emphasizes its 
creative destruction characteristic and one that emphasizes more the standing on the shoulder 
of giants effect. The latter has been studied during the presentation of the Hoon and Phelps 
(2011) paper. The foundation of the former can be traced to Schumpeter and its vision of 
capitalism. According to him, the essence of capitalist economic development is the process of 
the creation by innovation of a new economic paradigm by the destruction and total 
replacement of the existing one. A modern example of a model involving this kind of dynamic 
can be found in Aghion and Howitt (1992) paper which “departs from existing models of 
endogeneous growth in emphasizing obsolescence of old technologies induced by the 
accumulation of knowledge and the resulting process or industrial innovations”(Aghion and 
Howitt (1992)). They assume there are four classes of goods: land, labour, consumption good 
and a continuum of intermediate goods        . There is also a continuum of identical 
infinitely lived individuals, each endowed with one unit of labour. There is disutility for supplying 
labour, a unique interest rate r and also a fixed supply of land H. The consumption good is 
produced using land and the intermediate goods, subject to constant returns :   
   
       
    
   
 
 
, x(i) being the flow of intermediate goods, F’ > 0, F’’<0 and c(i) being a parameter 
indicating, for given factor prices, the unit cost of producing the consumption good using the 
intermediate input i. Each intermediate good is produced using labour only, according to the  
linear technology : x(i) = L(i) where L(i) is the flow of labor used in the intermediate sector i. 
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Labour has also the alternate use, research which produces a random sequences of innovations. 
The stochastic process of the arrival of these innovations follows a Poisson distribution with 
parameter    where n is the flow of labour used in research and   a constant parameter given 
by the technology of research. An innovation consists of the invention of a new line of 
intermediate goods more efficient for producing consumption goods. Specifically, the use of the 
new line reduces the cost parameter c(i) by the factor        . The most modern intermediate 
technology is always the one used, without any delay in the adoption of the invention. A 
successful innovator obtains a continuum of patents, one for each intermediate sector, each one 
granting the holder the exclusive right to produce the newly invented intermediate good in that 
sector. In this model, the innovation process is endogenous (a firm employing z in research will 
have a Poisson parameter of   ), and the decision to invest is subject to a profit maximisation 
problem. The innovator always has to sell the patent to a “new” intermediate firm that will be a 
monopolist until a better invention is made. The model thus represents the Schumpeter’s idea: 
“Each innovation is an act of creation aimed at capturing monopoly rents. But it also destroys 
the monopoly rents that motivated the previous creation” (Aghion and Howitt (1992)). There 
are interesting macroeconomic results in this paper such as:  
“Proposition 3: The amount of research performed in a positive balanced growth equilibrium 
(a) decreases with the rate of interest r 
(b) increases with the arrival parameter  
(C) increases with the size of each innovation (i.e. decrease with v) 
(d) increases with the total labor endowment N” 
 
3.4 Game theory 
 
For game theorists, the decision to participate in the process of innovation can be seen 
as a game with its own strategies, pay offs and equilibrium. The main idea is that multiple firms 
compete to be the first one to complete an innovation in order to patent it (a patent race) or to 
engage in a competition with other firms for the leading position in an industry. Models of this 
category rely a lot on profit maximisation for decision taking just as industrial organization ones. 
However, they differ mainly because game theory models emphasize a lot on complex strategies 
for the firms and the search for Nash equilibrium or one of its extensions.  
 
The first model to be presented is from Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar (2008) paper 
and is mostly about intellectual property and the efficiency of patents to reach optimal 
allocation. It has already been discussed that this idea is not accepted by everyone. Boldrin and 
Levine (2008), Quah (2002) and many others have taken position against it. Nonetheless, this 
hypothesis is another common point between IO theorists and Game theorists. The model is 
structured as follows, there are 2 symmetric potential innovators contemplating a pool of ideas. 
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Each firm receives a private signal on which of these projects is more likely to lead to an 
innovation and can decide to experiment with any of these projects at any point in time. The 
optimal allocation and the symmetric equilibrium involve sequential experimentation. The two 
firms maximise the present discounted value of profits. Let us assume that Let us denote the 
time interval between two consecutive periods by delta> 0, assume   to be small. Each firm can 
implement (experiment with) one of M potential innovation projects, let us represent the set of 
projects by M = [1,...,m]. Each firm receives a private (positive) signal   element of M indicating 
the success potential of one of the projects. The unconditional probability that a project will be 
successful (when implemented) is small (close to 0). Conditional on the positive signal the 
success probability of a project is p > 0. They assume that the two firms always receive signals 
about different projects. The success or failure of experimentation by a firm is publicly observed. 
When experimentation is successful, they refer to this as an innovation. At each instant, a firm 
can choose one of three possible actions: (1) experiment with a project (in particular, with the 
project on which the firm has received a positive signal); (2) copy a successful project; (3) wait. 
Once the choice is made, a firm cannot change his made and undertake another action. This 
captures the fact that commitment of intellectual property and financial resources to a specific 
idea is necessary for success.  Payoffs depend on the success of the project and whether the 
project is copied. During an interval of length  , the payoffs to a firm that is the only one 
implementing a successful project is      , the payoff of a copied project is       and the 
payoff of an unsuccessful project is normalized to zero. They assume           and they 
define the present discounted value of profits as  
  
 
 j = 1, 2. Let a history up to time t (where t = 
k   for some integer k) be denoted by     . A strategy for a firm is therefore a mapping from its 
signal   and the history of the game up to time t, to the probability of experimentation at a 
given time interval and the distribution over projects. History up to time t can be summarized by 
two events           denoting whether the other firm has experimented up to time t,    
 denoting which project it has chosen in that case, and           denoting whether this 
choice was successful. Although this is a game of incomplete information, the only source of 
asymmetric information is the identity of the project about which a firm has received a positive 
signal. According to the authors, it is therefore sufficient to focus on the subgame perfect 
equilibria in this game. This equilibria is a strategy profile           such that     is the best 
response to      in all histories  
     for i = 1, 2. Even if the firms are symmetric, there are 
cases of symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. For the details on the resolution of these 
equilibria and for expansions such as continuous time, multiple firms and the application to 
patents, one should refer to the paper. Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar conclude that patents 
may improve the allocation of resources by encouraging rapid experimentation and ex post 
transfer of knowledge across firms. 
 
Next, the Persson, Norback’s (2007) paper studies the impact of increased product 
market competition and strengthened competition policy on the incentive for and pattern of 
innovation and innovation for entry. Their model includes the following characteristics: “there 
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are several incumbent firms competing in oligopoly fashion in a product market. Moreover 
there is an entrepreneur outside this market who invests in an innovative activity that could 
lead to the creation of a unique productive asset, which increases the profit of the possessor 
and decreases the profits of the rival firms” (Persson, Norback (2007)). It is a three period 
model, in the first period, nature determine the intensity of competition C. In the second one, 
the entrepreneur decides on the amount to invest in the innovative activity, a bigger investment 
increasing the likelihood of a successful invention.  In the third period, given successful 
innovation, the incumbent firms compete to acquire the rights on the entrepreneur’s innovation 
(innovation for sale) or, if no sale occurs, the entrepreneur has the opportunity to enter the 
market himself (innovation for entry). In the final period, firms compete in an oligopoly market. 
The authors use this framework to assess the impact of competition on the incentives for 
innovation. They found that increased competition can stimulate and hinder innovation. The 
reason is that the value of the invention depends on the advantages it gives to the buyer. In a 
market more competitive, even the smallest advantage can have a big influence on a buyer’s 
profit. On the other hand, more competition implies a smaller price and thus less profits to be 
made in the market. One can see a graph of the game representing this model in appendix 5. 
The backward resolution of the Nash equilibrium can be found in the paper, as well as the 
strategies and optimal strategies for each player.   This model has a lot of common point with 
the one of Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelps (2011). For example, there is a specific agent 
responsible of the creative innovation: the entrepreneur. He is contemplating and idea that 
requires investment (however the way the investment is designed is not the same in both 
models), and then he tries to sell this idea to someone else. In Amarante, Ghossoub and Phelps 
however it is not at an incumbent firms but at a financier that the entrepreneur tries to sell its 
idea. It is always surprising how all of the models that involve trying to define the value of an 
innovation before its entrance on the market never mention uncertainty. It is however hard to 
find a more uncertain activity than the venture investments.  
 
Finally, Reinganum (1981), a really proficient author in game theory and innovation, 
published numerous papers that were often referred to by many authors from various 
categories of this survey like, for example, Boldrin and Levine, Scotchmer, etc. This survey will 
present two of her most quoted paper but it is only a small part of the body of work she 
generated. The first one is her 1981 paper, in which she describes a patent race. The models 
goes as follows, there is two identical firms. The player i wins if he perfects the innovation 
before the other player j. Then, the winner of the race receives a patent whose worth is the 
present value (or expected present value in case of a stochastic reward stream) of the stream of 
rents accruing to a monopolist in the innovation’s industry. Also, knowledge is accumulated 
through R&D activities and time to completion of the innovation is determined by a random 
variable whose distribution depends on the knowledge accumulated by the firm. In this paper, 
the author uses an exponential distribution for this random variable. Therefore, the probability 
that firm i succeeds at or before time t is           where       is the accumulated knowledge. 
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There is also a date T at which the invention becomes completely obsolete it serves as limit on 
the lifetime of the patent. A pure strategy for i is therefore a function of both time t and the 
current levels of knowledge. The noncooperative game result is a Nash equilibrium where each 
firms accumulate knowledge at an optimal rate given the other firms strategy. Reinganum 
(1981) also studies the case in which negotiation and/or contract enforcement are not 
prohibitive and therefore when cooperative games are possible. She also includes in her model 
a parameter to express the embodiment attribute of knowledge.  The firms receive the present 
value of the patent as long as either one of them succeeds at completing the design of the 
invention. Since firms i and j jointly choose the rate of knowledge accumulation, the probability 
that the innovation is completed at or before t is now                   . Reinganum finds that 
the Nash equilibrium in this case involves a higher rate of R&D investment than with 
noncooperative rivals. However, when the knowledge is not completely embodied meaning that 
it is transferable between firms, the results are less robust. The cooperative rivals may innovate 
before or after noncooperative rivals.  She then concludes the paper with a discussion on the 
optimal level of investment, stating that rivalry leads to quicker innovation but can also lead to 
overspending in research, and a discussion on the public good attribute of knowledge, 
introducing the notion of spillovers in a way similar to those expressed above.  One can see that 
this model is the basic patent race that has been mentioned before. The patent race is present 
in industrial organisation theory but not as much as in game theories field where it is the core of 
the approach to innovation. Therefore, it was unavoidable to present at least a basic one even if 
the conceptual contribution of it is limited.  In her 1989 paper, Reinganum presents another 
form of patent race in which the firm who commits the greatest expenditure in R&D today will 
obtain the invention first. Therefore, the race can be represented by a kind of auction model 
where a strategy for firm i is a bid x and a Nash equilibrium is a vector of bids with the property 
that no firm would want to change its bid unilaterally. The firm with the largest bid is the 
winner. A peculiar aspect of this model is that no resources are expended until the winner is 
determined. She then extends the model to cases where the firms are asymmetrically placed 
like, for example, in the challenger/incumbent case. She also studies the timing and diffusion 
aspects of innovation.  The former is described through the process of licensing in the context of 
oligopolistic production. The diffusion discussion is about trying to explain why firms may delay 
the adoption of a profitable innovation. The key determinants, according to Reinganum (1989), 
are the declining adoption costs and the perception that the benefits of adoption decline with 




 The two last approach of innovation this survey will present before the concluding 
remarks are conceptualizations of innovation that do not fall in any previous category.  The first 
one has already been mentioned and is called the evolutionary model of innovation. This theory 
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has many proponents but only three will be presented here. The two first are Nelson and Winter 
and their book “An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change” (1982).  The main idea is that 
“firms at any time are viewed as possessing various capabilities, procedures, and decision rules 
(the genes) that determine what they do given external conditions. They also engage in various 
search operations (mutations) whereby they discover, consider, and evaluate possible changes 
in their ways of doing things. Firms, whose decision rules are profitable, given the market 
environment, expand; those firms that are unprofitable contract” (Nelson and Winter (1982)). 
The first model of their book involves a number of firms producing an homogenous product, 
using the two classic inputs : labor and physical capital. In any period, a firm is characterized by 
its capital stock (K) and the production technique it is using, which is described by a pair of input 
coefficients. The use of coefficient to describe a production technique goes back to Schumpeter. 
The firm’s activities that aim at improving the available technology for production are called 
searching. It invokes a pre-existing set of technological possibilities (the usual ideas pool) that 
the firm explores. The probability distribution of designing new techniques can be influenced by 
the firm’s R&D expenditures in searching. If a firm is successful in discovering a new technique, 
it is allowed a random draw in the set of potential ideas. The authors also assume that if a firm is 
profitable enough, it will do no searching at all. Moreover, they see the set of potential ideas as 
constantly growing with more productive ideas because of exogenous events. Instead of 
searching, a firm can also engage in another activity called imitation. The probability to transfer 
the existing technique to itself depends on the proportion of the industry production produced 
by this technique. Imitation is always of the best practice in the industry and is another way of 
modeling spillovers. Another author who also adopts the analogy between the inventive process 
and Darwinian evolution is J. Mokyr in his 1990 book “The Lever of Riches”. He states that in the 
evolutionary theory of innovation, there is no profit maximisation or rational thinking. Firms 
have a determined and fixed way of doing things, if this way is a good one than the firm survives 
and others imitate it. If the techniques of the firm are badly adjusted to the market conditions 
the firm disappears. Even the R&D expenditures decision can be seen in this way. If the firm 
spend too much or not enough then it is fated to fail. According to Mokyr, “The idea or 
conceptualization of how to produce a commodity may be thought of as the genotype, whereas 
the actual technique utilized by the firm in producing the commodity may be thought of as the 
phenotype of the member of a species” (Mokyr (1990)).  There is a large literature on models 
and applications of this kind of theory but has an analogy, it is a good way to expose a concept 
but it has a limited ability to explain it. Clearly, the innovation process and the biological 
evolution have similarities but they are not the same phenomenon. Therefore the theory of the 
latter cannot be blindly applied to the former.  
 
 The second of the uncategorized theory is the constraint-based notion of innovation. Its 
premise had already been described earlier. It is that men generate innovation in order to push 
back their limitations and therefore, those limitations are the source and the incentive of the 
creative process. An application of this concept to a more modern context is presented by Silber 
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in his 1983 paper on the constraint-based notion of innovation.   The industry in which the 
author applies this concept is the one of financial innovation. However, it is a more general idea 
that could be applied to almost any type of innovation.  In its application, Silber states that its 
main hypothesis is that “new financial instruments or practices are innovated to lessen the 
financial constraints imposed on firms” (Silber (1983)). Among the most important external 
constraints for financial institutions are government regulations. But the market and the 
competition from other firms are also other examples of constraints. Especially, if a firm 
possesses a market power it can generate huge pressure on the rest of the industry by setting 
the price. There also exist internally set constraints for financial firms like a target rate of growth 
for assets or a self-imposed liquidity ratio. Therefore, new sources of funding and new uses for 
those funds are designed when exogenous changes in the environment stimulate the search for 
new policy tools. Although financial innovation is generally not as expensive as the development 
of new technology (in a more technical sense), there is still a considerable expense for the 
design of new contracts, running a new secondary market or installing requisite computer 
equipment. The incentives to pursue such an endeavour therefore depend on a sustained 
increase of the potential profit that overcoming the constraint can provide. To validate its 
theory, the author then proceeds to the presentation of empirical evidence. He first refers to 
the study by Ben-Horim in which he successfully explained new bank products during the  years 
1952-70 observation. Then, Silber studies the years 1970-82 where he observes that the 









 In the first part of this survey, many concepts surrounding innovation were presented. 
Their number and the quantity of other related concepts that did not made the cut are the 
proofs that the literature on innovation is vast and rich. However, it has been clear since the 
beginning that while there is a large coverage of innovation’s related matters such as its sources, 
functions, characteristics, diffusion process, etc. there is still not a clear and commonly accepted 
definition of the phenomenon. It has been shown how each field: macroeconomics, game 
theory, industrial organization, etc. has its own definition with its own shortcomings and 
advantages. In most of the models seen in the second part, it was clear that the role played by 
the entrepreneur was poorly defined. It was also often mentioned in the literature that 
ambiguity and uncertainty (knightian) were intrinsic to innovation but that no model was trying 
to introduce them rigorously. The majority of the models use expected profit maximisation to 
represent the decision making process of the entrepreneurs. However this makes little sense 
without a proper treatment of uncertainty. How can one define a probability distribution for the 
profits flow of a not yet completed innovation? Moreover, it has been seen that most of the 
work done before had pervasive exogeneity which clearly undermine the explicative potential of 
the model.  Therefore, this survey must conclude that there is definitely a place for a new 
conceptualisation of the inventive process, one that would complete and maybe unify all those 
seen above.   
 
 Also, the question of interconnections between competitive markets and innovation is 
utterly present in the literature. Boldrin and levine in their 2003 paper argue that there is no 
clear answer whether competitive markets are better for innovation than monopolies and 
copyrights. According to them, in the absence of unpriced spillovers, the competitive 
equilibrium without copyrights and patents may fail to attain the first best only because ideas 
are indivisible. This could cause socially valuable ideas failing to be produced. However, they 
show that in the absence of indivisibility or if indivisibility is not binding, competitive market 
succeed in obtaining optimality. For Reinganum (1981) the opportunity of a supernormal profit, 
offered by intellectual protection, acts as a spur to innovative activities. Also, in the model she 
developed in her 1981 paper, the existence of rivals provides incentive to “overspend” on R & D, 
since only the first to succeed is rewarded. On an industry level, rivalry means that research 
effort will be duplicated as firms run parallel projects. However, it may be optimal to run parallel 
projects, since each additional project increases society’s chances of obtaining the innovation at 
an earlier date. On the other hand, the public good aspect of knowledge generation is well 
known. If a firm cannot expect to appropriate the full value of the knowledge it generates, its R 
& D effort will be correspondingly reduced. The patent system is an attempt to mitigate the 
disincentive of nonappropriability. However, the social value of an innovation may exceed the 
monopoly rents. Hence patents may provide only a partial remedy. While it is clear that the 
Nash equilibrium and the socially optimal rates of investment in R & D do not coincide (neither 
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with private nor public knowledge), it is not always clear a priori in which direction the bias acts. 
If knowledge is a pure public good and the social value of the innovation is high enough, then 
firms unambiguously underinvest as compared to the social optimum. In their “step by step” 
model, Aghion, Harris and Howitt (2001) also try to answer this question. According to them, the 
desire to escape competition is the greatest incentive for innovation. However, a more 
competitive market means smaller rents and thus smaller profits possibilities. They find that 
when they allow the product market competition and imitation to be varied together, the 
maximal (innovation) growth rate is always achieved by allowing the maximal degree of 
competition. Persson and Norback (2006) synthesize these two aspects of competition by using 
the framework developed in their paper. They also found that increased competition can 
stimulate and hinder innovation. The reason is that the value of the invention depends on the 
advantages it gives to the buyer. In a market more competitive, even the smallest advantage can 
have a big influence on a buyer’s profit. On the other hand, more competition implies a smaller 
price and thus less profits to be made in the market. Hence they have established an inversely 
U-shaped incentive for innovation for sale when increasing the intensity of competition by 
increasing the number of firms. Aghion and al (2001) empirically documented this inverted U-
shaped relationship between product market competition and innovation in the UK, using the 
privatizations during the Tatcher regime, the EU single-market program, and the investigations 
performed by the Monopoly and Merger Commisision. They also provide a theoretical model 
explaining this pattern. In their modeit, the incentive for innovation can increase when the 
intensity of competition increases since pre-innovation rents from innovations are reduced by 
more than the post-innovation rents of innovations. This “escape competition effect” stimulates 
innovations. 
 
Finally, innovation does not only have proponents. Some theorists mention the fact that 
more innovation means more complexity and thus more uncertainty. For example, Tufano in his 
2002 paper states that “there are other arguments that innovation leads to complexity that in 
turn leads to bad business decisions and social costs”. Given that markets are incomplete, one 
might assume that innovation that gives participants greater freedom of choice (in terms of 
spanning) would enhance social welfare almost by definition, in the sense of being pareto-
optimal. Unfortunately, this is not the case. For example, Elul (1995) studies the welfare effects 
of financial innovation in incomplete markets. Elul shows that the addition of a new security 
may have “almost arbitrary effects on agents’ utilities.” The introduction of a new security can 
“generically make all agents strictly worse off, or all agents strictly better off, or favor any group 
of agents over another.” This aspect of innovation is quite interesting, especially for one looking 
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Appendix 2 Diffusion of Financial Innovations: The Case of Junk Bonds and Note 












Appendix 4 Effectiveness of appropriability mechanism for product innovations 
 














food 89 58,54 18,26 21,18 53,37 39,83 51,18 
Petroleum 15 62 33,33 6,33 48,67 40,33 35,67 
Basic Chemicals 35 48 38,86 11,57 38,29 45,86 44,71 
Drugs 49 53,57 50,2 20,82 50,1 33,37 49,39 
Machine Tools 10 61,5 36 9 61 43 34,5 
Computers 25 44,2 41 27,2 61,4 40,2 38 
Electrical equipment 22 39,09 34,55 15 33,41 32,27 31,82 
Semiconductors and 
related 18 60 26,67 22,5 53,33 42,22 47,5 
Medical equipment 67 50,97 54,7 29,03 58,06 52,31 49,25 
Autoparts 30 50,83 44,36 15,65 64,35 44,84 53,06 
All 1118 51 34,83 20,71 52,76 42,74 45,61 
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